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AN ECOFEMINIST CRITIQUE OF M A R X
In the w riting s  of Karl M a rx  one can find  apparent inconsis­
tencies in  his thoughts on the hum an relationship to na tu re  and on 
utopian th inking. I t  seems th a t these tw o areas of M arx 's  thought 
are closely related, as are the reasons for the inconsistencies in  his 
ideas about them . On the one hand, some of M arx 's  w ritings  
indicate th a t hum ans are p a rt of nature, not separate from  it, and 
th a t the relationship between hum an and nonhum an na tu re  is a 
reciprocal one. In o ther w ritings, th a t ideal relationship is replaced 
b y  one of hum an "m aste ry" over nature , w here in  na tu re  is 
m ere ly  a resource to be used b y  humans. Regarding utopian 
th inking, a t tim es M a rx  is v is iona ry  in  his w r it in g  and paints 
pictures of an ideal com m unist society as he would like to see it. 
These images are v e ry  utopian, bu t pervading m uch of his w ork is 
a harsh critique  of and w arn ing  against utopian thought. How is 
one to make sense of the inconsistent ideas expressed b y  M a rx  on 
these tw o subjects? Perhaps the body of thought called eco-
fem in ism l can be helpful in  answering th is question since i t  is 
deeply concerned w ith  the h u m a n /n a tu re  relationship and w ith  the 
notion of utopia.
In his earlie r w ritings, most p a rtic u la r ly  the "Economic and 
Philosophical M anuscripts of 1844," M a rx  developed a the o ry  of the 
relationship between hum an and nonhum an na tu re  w h ich claimed 
th a t the tw o  are not as d is tinc t as we n o rm a lly  th in k  them  to be. 
He w en t so fa r as to call the  whole of na tu re  "the inorganic body of 
man," meaning th a t i t  sustains h u m a n ity  both physica lly  and 
in te llec tua lly  and th a t hum ans m ust m a in ta in  a constant 
interchange w ith  i t  as a condition of th e ir existence. (McLellan 1984, 
81). W ith in  th is  theory , na tu re  is not an abstract e n tity , removed 
from  and dom inated b y  hum an beings, bu t ra th e r a source of life 
fo r them , a rea lm  w h ich  is continuous w ith  th e ir  own hum an 
realm . I t  follows from  th is conception of the hum an/nonhum an 
na tu re  relationship th a t hum ans would have some sort of respect 
for nature, th a t th e y  would no t dom inate and exploit it. Even if 
acting on ly  ou t of self-interest, hum ans would not like ly  exploit 
nature , because th e y  would be ha rm ing  th e ir own inorganic body 
b y  doing so.
This e a rly  notion of the hum an relationship to na tu re  is not 
m ainta ined th roughout M arx 's  w ork; in  fact i t  is inconsistent w ith  
his guiding the o ry  of h istorica l m ate ria lism  in  w hich progress (and 
therefore hum an libera tion and self-realization) takes place on ly  
when the n a tu ra l w orld  is subjected to the m aste ry  of hum an
labourers. This de term in istic  v iew  of h is to ry  does not allow for 
hum ans to exist in  a reciprocal relationship w ith  nonhum an 
nature . I t  is necessary, according to th is  view , th a t na tu re  come 
to be seen as an object to be possessed and used under capitalism, 
w h ich  is also a necessary stage in  the unfolding of the h is to ry  of 
struggle w h ich  f in a lly  leads to the libe ra tion of the w orking class.
As M a rx  describes th is  aspect of the cap ita lis t stage:
Nature becomes fo r the f irs t tim e  s im p ly  an 
object fo r m ankind, pu re ly  a m a tte r of u t i l i ty ;  
i t  ceases to be recognized as a power in  its own 
righ t; and the theoretical knowledge of its  inde­
pendent laws appears on ly  as a stratagem  de­
signed to subdue i t  to hum an requirem ents, 
w hether as the object of consumption or as the 
means of production (363-4).
M a rx  goes on to say th a t th is  change is "perm anen tly  revo lu tion­
a ry , tearing down all obstacles th a t impede . . . the  exploitation 
and exchange of n a tu ra l and in te llectua l forces" (364). In other 
words, the explo itation of na tu re  goes hand in  hand w ith  the 
development of the forces of production under capitalism. The 
development of these forces and of capitalism  itself is, for M arx, a 
prerequisite to a com m unist society; i t  is th a t w h ich makes 
com m unism  possible and inevitable. The basis of M a rx ’s th e o ry  of 
com m unism  is th a t i t  grow s o u t o f capitalism .
This de term in istic  v ie w  of h is to ry  jus tifies  the dom ination and
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explo itation of na tu re  b y  hum ans b y  pointing ou t th a t i t  is 
inevitable (and essential fo r hum an freedom). The advancement of 
technology (apparently  w ith o u t regard for its adverse effects on the 
earth) is hailed as the key to the liberation of hum ans from  
slavery, serfdom, and the d rudgery  of labour and as th a t which 
brings about progress in  hum an relationships. I t  can be concluded 
from  th is idea th a t the dom ination of na tu re  is necessary for the 
liberation of humans. Humans are seen in  a v e ry  d iffe ren t 
relationship to na tu re  tha n  th e y  are in  the m u tu a l one described 
earlier. Humans are d istinct, apa rt from  nonhum an nature ; th e y  
are in  a position of dominance over it, and i t  is the irs  to do w ith  
as th e y  wall. I t  is a tool th a t th e y  m ust m anipu la te in  order to 
a tta in  th e ir  freedom.
W ith  m odern (industria l) technology understood as the 
paradigm atic relationship of dom ination between hum an and non­
hum an nature , a closer exam ination of M arx 's  statem ents about 
its  role in  hum an liberation clarifies the underly ing  assumption 
about the hu m a n /n a tu re  relationship. In the C om m unist 
M anifesto, M a rx  explains w h y  technology is an essential p a rt of 
the fa ll of capitalism  and the subsequent liberation of the w orking 
class:
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The essential condition fo r the existence, and 
fo r the sw ay of the bourgeosie class, is the 
fo rm ation  and augm entation of capital; the 
condition fo r capital is wage-labour. Wage 
labour rests exclusively on com petition between 
the labourers. The advance of in du s try , whose 
in v o lu n ta ry  prom oter is the bourgeoisie, replaces 
the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, 
b y  th e ir  re vo lu tion a ry  combination, due to 
association. The development of Modern Industry , 
therefore, cuts from  under its  feet the v e ry  
foundation on w h ich the bourgeosie produces 
and appropriates products. W hat the bour­
geosie, therefore, produces, above all, is its  own 
grave-diggers. Its fa ll and the v ic to ry  of the 
p ro le ta ria t are equally inevitab le  (230-1).
The w a y  in  w h ich the advance of in d u s try  replaces the isolation of 
the labourers "by  th e ir  revo lu tion a ry  combination, due to associ­
ation," is b y  allow ing isolated w orkers from  d iffe ren t places to have 
contact w ith  one another th rough im proved means of com m uni­
cation and transporta tion . In th is  w a y  th e y  are able to fo rm  a 
national union and then a revo lu tio n a ry  m ovem ent (228).
Another w a y  technology frees hum ans is through reducing 
the necessary labour tim e  of society to a m in im u m . "The counter­
p a rt of th is  reduction is th a t all m embers of society can develop 
th e ir  education in  the arts, sciences, etc., thanks to the free tim e  
and means available to all" (380).
M a rx  takes the liberating notion of technology the fa rthest in  
the Grundrisse, w hen he speaks of i t  as the realization of hum an
nature . This idea undoubtedly comes from  his basic claim  th a t 
hum ans are p r im a r ily  producers (hom o fa b e r) Of machines, 
locomotives, ra ilw ays, electric telegraphs, etc., he says, "These are 
products of hum an in d u s try ; n a tu ra l m a te ria l transform ed in to 
organs of the hum an w ill to dom inate na tu re  or to realize itself
there in " (381). M a rx  makes a d irect connection between the
realization of the hum an w ill and the dom ination of na ture  in  th is
passage, as he does between the development of the hum an as
social being and the m as te ry  of na tu re  in  the following passage on
the changes technology brings to the workplace (more specifically
the replacement of labourer b y  machine).
In th is  transfo rm ation , w h a t appears as the 
m a ins tay  of production and w ea lth  is ne ither 
the im m edia te labour perform ed b y  the worker, 
nor the tim e  th a t he works - b u t the appro­
p ria tion  b y  m an of his own general productive 
force, his understanding of na tu re  and the 
m aste ry  of it; in  a word, the development of 
the social ind iv idua l (380).
W ith  his basic premise of hum an na tu re  as hom o faber, M a rx  
com m its him self to the idea of a relationship of dom ination 
between hum an and nonhum an nature . If the most fundam enta l 
capacity of hum ans is th a t of production, o r labour, and if labour is 
w h a t M a rx  says i t  is in  Capital, then hum ans are in h e ren tly  
opposed to the n a tu ra l w orld  and w ill in e v ita b ly  exploit i t  to fu lf il l
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th e ir own desires. In the section titled , "The Production of Surplus 
Value," M a rx  writes:
Labour is, in  the f irs t place, a process in  which 
both m an and Nature partic ipate, and in  which 
m an of his own accord starts, regulates, and 
controls the m ate ria l reactions between himself 
and Nature, He opposes him self to Nature . . . 
setting in  m otion arm s and legs, head and hands, 
the n a tu ra l forces of his body, in  order to appropriate 
Nature's productions in  a fo rm  adapted to his own 
w ants (455).
Note th a t M arx 's  spelling of “na tu re " is now capitalized. “Nature" 
w ith  a capital "N" implies th a t na tu re  is now being considered 
an abstraction, a to ta lly  separate rea lm  fro m  the hum an, an 
"Other" w h ich is (theoretica lly) pu t a t a great enough distance th a t 
i t  can be dominated.
These references to the exp lo ita tive relationship of hum ankind 
to nature , each of w h ich is considered to be a d istinct sphere of 
re a lity , are rad ica lly  d iffe ren t fro m  those in  M arx 's  earlier w riting s  
to a hea lthy, balanced relationship between tw o parts of the same 
sphere. Paralleling th is inconsistency is the one in  M arx 's  
comments on utopian thought. Though a strong critic ism  and 
adam ant re jection of utopian socialism ru n  through m uch of his 
w ork, M a rx  undeniably has a utopian s tra in  in  his th ink ing  w h ich 
periodically escapes suppression and makes itself visible on the
page. One example of such expression is found in  his essay, "On 
James M ill," where he describes w h a t production would be like in  
an ideal situation, when i t  is done in  a “hum an m anner." M a rx  
w rites  glow ingly of the ind iv idua l's  production as an expression of 
her/h is  life, the producer's en jo ym en t in  fu lfillin g  a need of another 
who uses the product, the m u tu a lly  a ffirm in g  connection th a t 
takes place between producer and consumer, and the realization of 
the producer's com m unal hum an essence brought about through 
production as self-expression. He says, "In th a t case our products 
would be like so m a n y  m irro rs , ou t of w h ich our essence shone" 
(122). This vision of com m unist production is in  sharp contrast to 
the bleak p ic tu re  he painted earlier of production as i t  exists in  
re a lity  -  as alienated labour - and i t  de fin ite ly  has a utopian ring 
to it. In  C apita l (441), M a rx  describes another vision of the 
relationships of production in  a com m unist society. His ideal 
"com m un ity " seems m uch more compatible w ith  the utopian 
socialist Fourier's model of a small, decentralized economy than  
w ith  the predom inant v ie w  in  M arx 's  w riting s  of a h igh ly
centralized global econom y.2
Fourier's utopian socialism was spelled out in  detailed outline 
of the socialist co m m u n ity  he envisioned, w h ich he called the 
Phalanx. Schedules of a typ ica l day on the Phalanx were made up
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to show how a person's tim e  would be divided in to  a great v a r ie ty  
of d iffe ren t tasks. The reason fo r th is  v a r ie ty  was to insure th a t 
people enjoyed th e ir labour and did no t w o rk  under conditions of 
drudgery. "The great task of social thought, [Fourier] believed, was 
to show how w ork  and the apparen tly  incompatible desire for 
pleasure could be reconciled" (Beecher and Bienvenu 1971, 43). One 
of Fourier's guidelines fo r establishing a Phalanx was th a t "w ork 
sessions m ust be varied about eight tim es a day because a m an 
cannot rem ain  enthusiastic about his job  fo r more than  an hour 
and a ha lf or tw o w hen he is perform ing an ag ricu ltu ra l or 
m anufactu ring  task" (274).
In th e ir book, The U topian Vision o f Charles F ourier.; Jonathan 
Beecher and Richard Bienvenu (1971) point ou t th a t M arx 's  ea rly  
w ritings  revealed an a f f in ity  w ith  Fourier in  his vision of an ideal 
socialist society.
When M a rx  and Engels f irs t began th e ir lifelong 
collaboration th e y  did appear to believe th a t labor 
under scientific socialism m igh t indeed resemble 
the Phalansterian ideal. In The German Ideology 
th e y  predicted th a t socialist modes of production 
would make i t  'possible fo r me to do one th ing 
today, another tom orrow , to h u n t in  the m orning, 
fish in  the afternoon, rea r cattle  in  the evening, 
engage in  critic ism  a fte r d inner, ju s t as I please 
. . . This, obviously, is a ra th e r lim ited  version 
of a sum m er's day on the Phalanx, not qu ite as 
active or colorful and be tray ing  a Germanic
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penchant fo r higher in te llectua l activities, bu t a 
day on the Phalanx a ll the same. Later, however,
M a rx  rejected th is ideal as unrealistic and criticized 
Fourier fo r adopting a frivolous a ttitu d e  tow ard the 
serious problem of w ork  (70).
The reason fo r M arx 's  denunciation of utopian th ink ing  is 
appa ren tly  th a t i t  is incom patible w ith  his Hegelian notion of 
h istorica l determ in ism . The liberation of the w orking class was im ­
possible fo r h im  w ith o u t the necessary preceding stage of capita l­
ism, u n til the forces of h is to ry  determ ined i t  to happen. He 
explains th is idea fu r th e r  in  his c ritique  of utopian socialism in  the 
C om m unist M anifesto,
The f irs t d irect a ttem pts of the p ro le ta ria t 
to a tta in  its own ends, made in  times of 
un iversa l excitement, when feudal society 
was being overth row n, these a ttem pts 
necessarily failed, owing to the then u n ­
developed state of the p ro le ta ria t, as well 
as to the absence of the economic conditions 
fo r its emancipation, conditions th a t had ye t 
to be produced, and could be produced b y  the 
impending bourgeois epoch alone (243).
M arx 's  in a b ility  to reconcile his utopian visions of com m unist 
society w ith  the h istorica l de term in ism  upon w h ich he based his 
en tire  philosophy led h im  to denounce all utopian thought. It 
seems th a t th is  same problem is responsible fo r M arx 's  abandon­
m en t of his ea rly  notion of a reciprocal hum an /na tu re  relationship. 
It, too, was too idealistic, too far-rem oved from  re a lity , to have a
place in  his philosophy. Both of these rejected w ays of th ink ing  
seem to have been M arx 's  in it ia l inclinations, bu t his lo y a lty  to the 
determ in istic v ie w  of h is to ry  did not a llow  these v is ionary  ideas to 
have m uch influence in  the overa ll development of his thought.
I t  can be argued from  an ecofeminist perspective th a t M arx  
should have paid m ore a tten tion  to his v is ion a ry  thoughts and 
should have been less fa ith fu l to h istorica l determ inism . Eco- 
fem in ism  shares M arx 's  e a rly  inclinations fo r a non-oppositional 
relationship between hum ans and na tu re  and for the notion of 
utopia. A basic defin ition of ecofeminism w ill be a helpful 
beginning to an exploration of its  response to M a rx  on these 
m atters. Ecofeminism is a synthesis of fem in is t and ecological 
thought. Because of the h istorica l association of women w ith
n a t u r e , 3 ecofeminists believe th a t the fem in is t and ecology 
movements (and th e ir corresponding theories) need to in fo rm  one 
another in  order to  be thorough in  th e ir  analyses of domination. 
Ecofeminism is based on the belief th a t all form s of dom ination are 
related and therefore.includes an. analysis .of racism, classism ,jm d 
heterosexism in  addition to th a t of sexism and the dom ination of 
nature . The fundam enta l premise js  th a t an oppressive 
relationship (i.e., th a t between m en and women) cannot be healed 
w hen i t  js  addressed ln.lsolatlon. rem oved from  the context of
other form s ofoppression (most p a rtic u la r ly  in  th is  case, th a t of 
na tu re  b y  humans).
The m a jo r point of departure  fo r ecofeminism from  other 
fem inism s is the n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism. Ecofeminism seeks to do 
a w ay w ith  th is  dualism  th a t is perpetuated in  other form s of
fem in ism  A According to ecofeminism, the na tu re /cu ltu re  dualism 
w h ich pervades our thought does not recognize the fact th a t 
hum an cu ltu re  is not separate fro m  non-hum an na tu re  bu t th a t i t  
evolved out of i t  and is necessarily connected to and p a rt of it.
The n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  de-contextualizes hum an cu ltu re  b y  
rem oving it  from  its  proper place as pa rt of na tu re  and placing it  
over and above na tu re  w here i t  rules and exploits it. In the same 
w ay, na tu re  is de-contextualized, objectified, and tu rned in to  an 
abstraction and a resource. H istorically, men have been identified 
w ith  the cu ltu re  side of the dualism  and women w ith  the na tu re  
side. For this reason, the na tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  is a centra l 
concern fo r ecofeminism.
As ecofeminist Ynestra King (1990) says,
It is as if wom en were entrusted w ith  and 
kept the d ir ty  lit t le  secret th a t h u m a n ity  
emerges from  non-hum an na ture  in to  
society in  the life  of the species, and the 
person. The process of n u rtu r in g  an u n ­
socialized, und iffe ren tia ted  hum an in fa n t
in to  an ad u lt person - the socialization of the 
organic - is the bridge between na ture  and 
culture. . . . The key to the historic agency of 
wom en w ith  respect to na tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  
lies in  the fact th a t the m ediating trad itiona l 
conversion activ ities of wom en - m othering, 
cooking, healing, farm ing, foraging - a re  as 
socia l as th e y  a re  n a tu ra l (17, emphasis 
added).
King does not cla im  th a t wom en are in h e re n tly  closer to na tu re  
than  men (tha t would be assuming the n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism, 
w ith  wom en m ore on the na tu re  side and men more on the 
cu ltu re  side), bu t does cla im  th a t because of th e ir assigned social 
roles throughout h is to ry , th e y  m a y  be in  a position to see more 
c learly  and to appreciate more fu l ly  the connections between 
cu ltu re  and nature. M a n y  "radical fem inists" do m a in ta in  th a t 
women are in he re n tly  closer to na tu re  than  men and th a t they  
can therefore change the w orld  fo r the benefit of nature, bu t in 
th is  v iew  men are w r it te n  off as hopelessly and in h e re n tly  
unconnected to na ture . (This is a reversal of the dualism -  here, 
na tu re  and wom an are placed over cu ltu re  and man.) Eco­
fem inism , on the other hand, m a in ta ins  the hope th a t a ll humans, 
male and female, w ill be able to be reconciled w ith  na ture . It sees 
the need to overcome the m ale/fem ale dualism  along w ith  the 
n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  and to replace them  both w ith  hea lthy  
relationships.
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M arx 's  e a rly  w ritings  about a close relationship between 
hum an and nonhum an na tu re  seem to be based on a s im ila r 
notion about n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  - th a t it 's  an illusion to th in k  
th a t there is a sharp distinction between the two, because one 
grew out of the other and rem ains a p a rt of it. But in  M arx 's  
la te r w ritings, he does d raw  a line w here he earlier said none could 
be drawn. This line between hum ans and na tu re  is essential to his 
the o ry  th a t the dom ination of na tu re  through production and 
technology is an im p o rta n t element in  the liberation of hum an 
labourers. For ecofeminists, th is  th e o ry  is unacceptable, since they 
believe th a t oppression m ust be dealt w ith  a t its  roots in  order for 
i t  to be overcome and th a t one fo rm  of oppression cannot be 
singled ou t fo r a pro ject of liberation w h ich is based on another 
fo rm  of oppression. The follow ing comments b y  Ynestra King (1990) 
are helpfu l in  m aking the case th a t technology and the dom ination 
of na tu re  are no t t r u ly  libe ra to ry .
A c ritica l analysis of and opposition to the u n i­
fo rm ity  of technological, indus tria l cu ltu re  - 
capita list and socialist - is crucia l to fem inism , 
ecology and the struggles of indigenous peoples.
A t th is  po int in  h is to ry , there is no w a y  to un­
rave l the m a tr ix  of oppressions w ith in  hum an 
society w ith o u t a t the same tim e  liberating 
na tu re  and reconciling th a t p a rt of na tu re  w hich 
is hum an w ith  th a t p a rt w h ich is not. Socialists 
do not have the answer to these problems - the y
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share the a n ti-n a tu ra lism  and basic dualism of 
capitalism. A lthough i t  was developed b y  capitalism, 
the technological means of production utilized by  
capitalist and socialist states is la rge ly the same.
A ll h ith e rto  existing philosophies of liberation, w ith  
the possible exception of some form s of social 
anarchism , accept the notion th a t h u m a n ity  should 
dom inate nature , and th a t the increasing dom ination 
of non-hum an na tu re  is a precondition fo r true  
hum an freedom (4).
Related to  M arx 's  notion of the n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism as 
libera ting is th a t of the dualism  as necessary to his understanding 
of hum an nature . M a rx  ce rta in ly  upholds the na tu re /cu ltu re  
dualism  w hen he says, as quoted earlier, th a t in  the labour 
process, the labourer controls and opposes na tu re  and appropriates 
i t  fo r the satisfaction of his wants. Since labour is the 
fundam enta l capacity of hum ans and the biggest p a rt of hum an 
nature , M a rx  is saying th a t hum ans are in h e re n tly  distinct, apart 
from , and ru le rs  over nature . This is a clear and strong a rticu ­
la tion of the n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism.
The notion of hum ans as hom o fa b e r is too lim itin g  fo r eco­
fem inism . I t  reduces the richness and com plexity and beauty of 
h u m a n ity  to the simple role of w orker, and, in  M arx 's  thought, as 
spelled ou t above, i t  opposes hum an na tu re  to non-hum an nature. 
The ecofeminist a lte rna tive  to th is  opposition is a non-dualistic 
re lationship between hum ans and na tu re  w h ich  would probably be 
consistent w ith  M arx 's  ideas on na tu re  in  the "Economic and
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Philosophical M anuscripts." Though no d is tinct line is draw n 
between the hum an and n a tu ra l realms, the tw o  are not to ta lly  
merged together; the uniqueness of each is respected ra th e r than  
blurred. The proposed a lte rna tive  to dualistic th ink ing  is 
"ecological" th ink ing, w h ich  is based on the concepts of in te r­
dependence and balance found in  the science of ecology -  concepts 
th a t are con trad ic to ry  to the h ierarchical dualism  th a t underlies 
the systems of oppression. Following ecology, ecofeminism sees the 
w orld  in  term s of in te rre la tions among people, beings, things. 
Relations of hum ans to  nonhum an nature , of d iffe ren t genders, 
races, classes, etc., to one another would no t be oppositional or 
hierarchical. The ecological principle of "u n ity  in  d ive rs ity " provides 
a model fo r a new w o rld v iew  in  w h ich differences are recognized 
bu t not ranked or opposed to one another. I t  tells us th a t 
d ive rs ity  in  na tu re  is necessary and enriching, and the same is 
tru e  in  the hum an realm . An acceptance of and hea lthy  respect 
for d ive rs ity  is an im p o rta n t elem ent in  overcoming oppression of 
all kinds, since the reason th a t most groups are oppressed is 
because th e y  are d iffe ren t fro m  the established and ru ling  "norm ."
Respect fo r d iv e rs ity  is perhaps the most basic idea fo r the 
revo lu tion envisioned b y  ecofeminism. Such a revo lu tion would not 
be a revo lu tion in  M a rx ’s sense of the word, bu t a peaceful,
gradual one th a t is worked toward, w h ich  does not happen a ll of a 
sudden due to economic and other forces. This revo lu tion would 
include m uch in  the w a y  of libera tion from  all form s of dom­
ination. A new w a y  of th ink ing  about our relatedness to each 
other and to nonhum an na tu re  is the on ly  th ing  th a t can save our 
world. The antagonistic mode of th in k in g  th a t feels uncom fortable 
w ith  or threatened b y  difference and therefore needs to oppress 
and silence i t  m ust be unlearned. This mode causes us to p it "self" 
against "o the r” in  a ll kinds of relationships. We use w h a t power 
our position in  life affords us to keep the "others” down, w hether 
th e y  be women, people of color, lesbians or gay men, working-class 
people, or nonhum an form s of life.
M uch of th is  power th a t people have over others is economic 
power, the d is tribu tion  of w h ich would be m uch m ore equitable in  
a re vo lu tio n a ry  society. An ideal society fro m  an ecofeminist 
perspective, like a M a rx is t one, would do aw ay w ith  capitalism. 
However, i t  would look m ore like a society imagined b y  the pre- 
M a rx is t utopian socialists than  like a M a rx is t one. Ecofeminism
has m ore in  common w ith  utopian socialism and social anarchism 5 
than  w ith  M arxism . It  envisions decentralized com m unities based 
on cooperation and m u tua lism  w h ich  are sm all enough th a t th e ir 
governance can be pa rtic ip a to ry , and i t  ac tive ly  works tow ard the
realization of th is  vis ion w ith o u t w a iting  fo r an h is to rica lly  
determ ined revo lu tion to bring i t  in to  being. To M arx, th is all 
sounds v e ry  utopian and therefore unacceptable in  practical terms, 
a lthough he did exh ib it utopian th ink ing  in  his w ritings  from  tim e  
to tim e. As explained earlier, M a rx  rejected utopian thought 
because i t  is inconsistent w ith  his th e o ry  of historical determ inism , 
w h ich  claims th a t a revo lu tion w ill happen on ly  w hen and if 
h istorica l conditions are r ig h t fo r it.
This de term in ism  is inadequate and inaccurate in  respect to 
fem inism . M arx 's  v ie w  of the unfolding of h is to ry  included the 
belief th a t p a tr ia rc h y  would necessarily dissolve under the capital­
ist mode of production, as women were d raw n in to  the wage 
labour force b y  it. Contem porary M arx is ts  cla im  th a t p a tr ia rch y  
w ill dissolve in  a socialist state w ith  the disappearance of both 
p riva te  p ro pe rty  and the sexual division of labor th a t excludes 
women from  the public rea lm  of production. Both of these claims 
are obviously false, as we have observed th a t ne ither capitalist nor 
socialist states have ceased to be pa tria rcha l. M arx ism  is not able 
to adequately account fo r the system atic oppression of women. 
Clearly, fem inists cannot w a it fo r "the revo lu tion" (in the M arx is t 
sense) to liberate them  from  th e ir  oppression as women.
The ecofeminist notion of revo lu tion is necessarily utopian. I t
is a vision of something we have no defin ite historical model for 
bu t th a t we m ust construct and s trive  to achieve. I t  is im pera tive  
th a t we do som ething  to be tte r our present situation. Patrocinio 
Schweickart (1983), in  her a rtic le  on "Science and Technology in  
Fem inist Utopias," says th is of "the a ll too real th re a t of violence 
and w ar, and of ecological depletion and pollution":
These im pending catastrophes are traced not 
on ly  to science and technology or to the m is­
guided overconfidence in  reason but, u ltim a te ly , 
to the dom ination of wom en in  pa tria rcha l 
society. Against th is  c ritique  of our own world, 
utopia is offered as a possible a lte rna tive ; not 
something th a t is bound to happen, bu t some­
th ing  a tta inab le  on ly  b y  d in t of conscious and 
prodigious effort. Utopia is necessary, not be­
cause i t  is logically or h is to rica lly  necessary, 
bu t because we need i t  (199).
Schweickart implies th a t the notion of h istorica l determ in ism  is
inadequate fo r re vo lu tio n a ry  politics in  the face of these "all too
real threats." Her s ta tem ent th a t utopia is necessary “because we
need i t "  is a good su m m a ry  of the ecofeminist position on utopia.
We are in  such a bad s itua tion th a t w ith o u t envisioning a better
w o rld  we w ill no t be able to make one fo r ourselves. Eco­
fem inism , w ith  its  analyses of a ll form s of dom ination, sees all too 
c learly  how  fa r we are from  w here we need to be in order for 
people and na tu re  to be free fro m  exploitation. A w orld  w ith o u t
oppression, w here severed relationships among a ll classes of 
hum ans and between hum an and nonhum an na tu re  are repaired, 
is ce rta in ly  a utopia, b u t th a t does not mean th a t we should not 
s trive  tow ard it, th a t i t  should not be a guiding vision for our 
revo lu tio n a ry  politics. "Guiding vision" in  th is  context does not 
re fer to a static, fixed goal w h ich  m ust be achieved, bu t to a 
dynam ic, flexible vision w h ich  is everchanging and growing as we 
change and grow and w h ich  is probably never "accomplished" in 
the fina l sense of th a t word. In re fu ting  M arx , we could use 
Schweickart's closing words: "utopia is no t alien to  hum an na tu re  
bu t on ly  the expression of the best in  us, the authentic  realization 
of our nature: 'tru e  jo u rn e y  is re tu rn '"  (1983, 210).
M arx 's  groundedness in  re a lity  and lo y a lty  to the actual 
conditions of economic life are a helpfu l and im p o rta n t p a rt of 
revo lu tio n a ry  philosophy th a t ecofeminism does not share.
C erta in ly th is  lack on the p a rt of ecofeminism is a shortcoming 
w hen ta lk ing  in  practica l term s; i t  would be ludicrous to M arx.
But from  an ecofeminist perspective, a greater shortcom ing is th a t 
of M a rx  in  no t exploring the real, deep questions of dom ination and 
h ie ra rchy . These questions m ust be tackled a t th e ir roots if we are 
to e ffective ly  w o rk  fo r tru e  liberation.
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MOTES
1. The te rm  "ecofeminism" is presently  used to refer to a diverse 
range of ideas, some of w h ich are inconsistent w ith  one 
another. The body of thought I d ra w  upon in  th is paper is 
th a t developed b y  Ynestra King during  the past dozen years.
The in te rp re ta tio n  given in  th is  paper is based on m y  under­
standing of King's the o ry  as i t  appears in  her m a n y  articles, 
most p a rticu la rly , "Healing the Wounds: Feminism, Ecology, 
and N ature/C u lture  Dualism,” in  Alison M. Jaggar and Susan 
R. Bordo, eds., G ender/Body/Knowledge: F em in ist Reconstruc­
tions o f Being an d  Knowing, (forthcom ing in  1990 from  ?).
2. This comparison between M arx 's  vision and Fourier's utopia was 
pointed out to me b y  Ron Perrin.
3. M uch has been w r it te n  about the historica l w om an/na tu re  
connection and how i t  has contribu ted to the dom ination of 
both. The most w e ll-know n books th a t have been w r itte n  on 
th is  topic are Carolyn M erchan t's  The Death o f N a tu re : Women, 
Ecology and  th e  S c ie n tific  R evolution  (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1980), and Susan Griffin 's W oman and N a tu re : The 
R oaring Inside H er (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). There are 
num erous o ther works on the  subject.
4. According to Ynestra King, libera l and socialist fem in ism  m ain­
ta in  the n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  b y  a ttem pting  to overcome the 
w o m an /na tu re  connection th rough acceptance as equals in the 
male cu ltu re . In w an ting  to sever the w om an /na tu re  
connection w h ich  has played a large p a rt in  th e ir oppression, 
th e y  feel the need to  abandon the rea lm  of na ture  
(theoretica lly) and to gain status as p a rt of culture. 
Understandably, th is  is the on ly  hope fo r liberation th a t these 
fem inists see. On the other hand, one fo rm  of radical 
fem in ism  embraces the w o m an /na tu re  connection whole­
hearted ly , c la im ing th a t wom en and na tu re  are related and are 
superior to m en and cu lture. They reverse the dualism from  
its  no rm a l fo rm  of m en /cu ltu re  as superior and w om en/nature 
as’ in fe rio r, b u t in  doing so th e y  m a in ta in  the dualism.
(King 1990, 7-15).
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5. "For social anarchists, then, the revo lu tion  is a process, no t a 
point in  tim e; and how one lives one's d a ily  life is v e ry  im por­
tan t. People don 't learn th a t th e y  can live  w ith o u t leader­
ship elites b y  accepting socialist ones; th e y  do not end power 
relationships b y  creating new ones" (Ehrlich 1981, 114). Note the 
s im ilarities in  w h a t Ehrlich says about a social anarchist 
revo lu tion and w h a t I have said about an ecofeminist 
revolution. The roots of ecofeminism are la rge ly in 
social anarch is t-fem in is t thought.
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IN SEARCH OF AN  ECOFEMINIST UTOPIA
The pro ject of ecofeminlsm, in part, is the liberation of women 
and nature . The w orld  i t  envisions is one th a t is v e ry  fa r from  
the re a lity  of our own and is therefore often called "utopian." 
Several fem in is t u topian novels offer visions of societies th a t do not 
oppress women and th a t have somewhat sound relationships w ith  
th e ir  n a tu ra l env ironm ent. They m ake e ither explicit or im p lic it 
connections between the favorable position of wom en and the 
respectful tre a tm e n t of the na tu ra l world, and th e y  can be 
considered ecofeminist utopias in  th a t sense. Utopian thought is an 
im p o rta n t element in  ecofeminist th e o ry  and practice. It w ill be 
helpfu l to evaluate some of these novels fro m  an ecofeminist 
perspective to determ ine w he the r the stories th e y  te ll are 
constructive in  bringing the ecofeminist vision to life. Three novels 
appropriate fo r th is  discussion are The W anderground: S tories o f 
th e  H ill Women, b y  S a lly  Gearhart; Herland, b y  Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman; and W oman on th e  Edge o f Time, b y  Marge Piercy.
Since the te rm  "ecofeminism" is c u rre n tly  used to  represent a 
diverse range of ideas, I w ill c la r ify  m y  own use of th a t te rm .
M y  understanding of ecofeminism is based on the w ork  of Ynestra
King, a pioneer in  ecofem inist th e o ry  and ac tiv ism .i The
fundam enta l prem ise of King's th e o ry  is th a t an oppressive 
re la tionsh ip  (i.e., th a t between m en and wom en) cannot be healed 
w hen i t  is addressed in  isolation, rem oved from  the  context of 
o ther form s of oppression (i.e., th a t of n a tu re  b y  humans). Since 
ecofem inism  is based on the  belief th a t a ll form s of dom ination are 
related, i t  includes analyses of racism , classism, and heterosexism  
in  add ition to  those of sexism and the  dom ination of na ture . A ll of 
these instances of dom ination are products of the preva iling  
dua listic  w o rld v ie w  w h ich  deals w ith  difference b y  d iv id ing  re a lity  
in to  tw o halves, assigning h igher va lue  to  one h a lf and low er value 
to  the  other. This d ivis ion p its  self against o ther in  a ll kinds of 
relationships, and we use w h a t power ou r position in  life  affords us 
to keep the  "others" down, w h e the r th e y  be wom en, people of 
color, lesbians or gay men, working-class people, o r nonhum an 
form s of life . Because of th e ir com m on roots, these form s of 
oppression m ust be addressed in  connection w ith  one another.
W hile ecofem inism  recognizes those connections and a ttem p ts  to 
address a ll oppressive re lationships, i t  focuses on the jo in t 
dom inations of wom en and na tu re , because th e ir h is to rica l
association w ith  one another2 means th a t th e y  are m u tu a lly  
re in forc ing  and in e x trica b ly  linked.
The m a jo r po in t of departu re  fo r ecofem inism  fro m  other
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fem inism s is the  n a tu re /c u ltu re  dualism . Ecofem inism  seeks to  do 
aw ay w ith  th is  dualism  th a t is perpetuated in  o ther form s of
fem in ism  3 According to ecofem inism , the  n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  
w h ich  pervades ou r though t does no t recognize the  fact th a t 
hum an cu ltu re  is no t separate fro m  nonhum an na tu re  b u t th a t it  
grew  out of i t  and is necessarily connected to and p a rt of it. The 
n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  decontextualizes hum an cu ltu re  by 
rem oving it  fro m  its  proper place as p a rt of n a tu re  and placing it  
over and above n a tu re  w here it  rules and exploits it. In the same 
w a y, na tu re  is decontextualized, ob jectified, and tu rn e d  in to  an 
abstraction and a resource. H isto rica lly , m en have been identified  
w ith  the cu ltu re  side of the  dualism  and wom en w ith  the  na tu re  
side. For th is  reason, the  n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  is a cen tra l 
concern fo r ecofem inism .
The ecofem inist a lte rn a tive  to th is  dualistic, oppositional 
re la tionsh ip  between hum ans and n a tu re  is a close, m u tu a l one 
w h ich  is based on an e vo lu tio n a ry  understanding of how hum an 
cu ltu re  emerged out of nonhum an n a tu re  and therefore recognizes 
the connection between the  two. Though no d is tinc t line  is draw n 
between the  hum an and n a tu ra l realm s, the  tw o  are not to ta lly  
merged together; the  uniqueness of each is respected ra th e r tha n  
b lu rred . The proposed a lte rn a tive  to  dua lis tic  th in k in g  is ecological
th in k in g , w h ich  is based on the  concepts of interdependence and 
balance found in  the  science of ecology -  concepts th a t are 
co n tra d ic to ry  to  the  h ie ra rch ica l dualism  th a t underlies the 
system s of oppression. Follow ing ecology, ecofem inism  sees the 
w o rld  in  te rm s of in te rre la tio n s  among people, beings, things. 
Relations of hum ans to nonhum an na tu re  and of d iffe re n t genders, 
races, classes, etc., to one another are no t oppositional or 
h ie ra rch ica l. The ecological princ ip le  of "u n ity  in  d iv e rs ity " provides 
a model fo r a new w o rld v ie w  in  w h ich  differences are recognized 
b u t not ranked or opposed to  one another. I t  te lls  us th a t 
d iv e rs ity  in  na tu re  is necessary and enriching, and the  same is 
tru e  in  the  hum an rea lm , according to ecological th ink ing . An 
acceptance of and h e a lth y  respect fo r d iv e rs ity  is an im p o rta n t 
elem ent in  overcom ing oppression of a ll kinds, since the  reason th a t 
m ost groups are oppressed is because th e y  are d iffe re n t fro m  w h a t 
is considered the  "norm ." From  an ecological perspective, though, 
"otherness" need no t be considered in fe rio r; if  accepted, we can 
lea rn  fro m  i t  and en rich  ou r own lives th rough connection w ith  
"others."
Ecological th in k in g  means th a t m en cannot be excluded from  
the  ecofem inist vision. Ynestra King has borrowed the te rm  "tw o - 
handed fem in ism " fro m  p a c ifis t-fem in is t Barbara Deming to
describe ecofem inism  A The tw o  hands are: (1) the  restra in ing  
hand, w h ich  expresses c ritic ism  of and anger a t oppression, and (2) 
the  open hand, w h ich offers the  possib ility  of reconciliation. 
"W ithou t the  [res tra in in g ] hand of c ritic ism  and m ilita n t non­
v io le n t resistance, reco nc ilia to ry  ecofem inism  runs the risk  of 
selling out, o r lapsing in to  meaningless m ush" (King 1988, 127). 
W ith o u t the  open hand, the  m ale/fem ale dualism  is m aintained, 
and the  possib ility  of in d iv id u a l and social tran s fo rm a tio n  is not 
kept open (for men).
The th ree  utop ian novels under consideration here each use 
d iffe re n t hands or a com bination of the tw o. The W anderground: 
S tories o f the  H ill Women exh ib its o n ly  the restra in ing  hand. It is 
the s to ry  of a mass exodus of wom en from  "the C ity," w h ich has 
become unbearab ly m isogynist. Threatened b y  fem in ism  and the 
increasing independence of wom en, the  establishm ent has 
responded w ith  extrem e restric tions of and violence against women. 
A dress code is established to  force wom en to w ear "ladylike" 
clothes (no pants), and o the r laws are enacted to keep women in  
th e ir place. Beatings, rapes, even m urders, are increasingly 
com m on m ethods of keeping wom en in  submission. Lesbians are 
p a rtic u la rly  despised and targeted fo r violence. M ore and m ore 
wom en fin d  these conditions unbearable and plan secret getaways
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to  flee the  C ity. They lite ra lly  ru n  fo r the h ills, w here th e y  
establish a co m m u n ity  of wom en based on liv in g  in  ha rm on y w ith  
the  earth . They b ring  no th ing w ith  them  from  the C ity, so th e y  
are forced to  s ta rt fro m  scratch w ith o u t the  aid of the  technology 
w h ich  th e y  associate w ith  the violence of the  C ity.
A t firs t, the  a u th o ritie s  from  the  C ity chased the fleeing 
wom en, captured and /o r k illed  them . M ale citizens developed a 
sport called "Cunt Hunts," in  w h ich  th e y  drove out in to  the 
co u n try , hunted fo r wom en and raped them . Then one day, as 
some m en a ttem pted  to  rape tw o  wom en th e y  captured in  the 
h ills , th e y  found th e y  w ere im potent. It was discovered th a t a ll 
m en had become im po ten t outside the  C ity  lim its . A t the same 
tim e , m achines and weapons had stopped w ork ing  outside the C ity. 
Logging trucks fe ll o ff the  sides of m ounta ins, horses in  a rodeo 
th re w  th e ir m ale ride rs  off, and the  n a tu ra l w o rld  generally 
revo lted  against m ale violence tow ards the  ea rth  and women. The 
s to ry  of th is  re vo lt is to ld  to  la te r generations in  the 
W anderground as p a rt of th e ir "rem em bering" and is called "The 
Revolt of the  M other."
Once upon a tim e, the re  was one rapeS too 
m a n y  . . . .  The ea rth  fin a lly  said 'no.' There 
was no sto rm , no earthquake, no tid a l wave or 
volcanic e ruption , no specific m om ent to m ark  
its  happening. I t  o n ly  became apparent th a t i t
had happened, and th a t i t  had happened e ve ry ­
w here (G earhart 1979, 158).
As a resu lt, wom en and the  e a rth  w ere protected from  m ale 
violence. Now wom en could live  peacefu lly in  the cou n try , as allies 
w ith  the  ea rth . In fact, a fte r m a n y  years of developing th e ir 
psychic powers ra th e r th a n  destructive  technology, the H ill Women 
can com m unicate w ith  anim als, trees, etc. There is a genuine 
re c ip ro c ity  in  th e ir re la tionsh ip  w ith  nonhum an creatures and an 
un de rly in g  assum ption th a t such creatures and the land are a t 
least as deserving of respect as hum ans are, if  no t m ore so. The 
close, caring re la tionsh ip  between the  H ill W omen and nonhum an 
na tu re  is the  m ost harm onious one of the  th ree  described in  these 
novels and also represents the  strongest ecological sta tem ent made.
G earhart pa in ts an exem plary p ic tu re  of how hum ans m ig h t 
re la te  to  n a tu re  in  a utopian society. The possib ility  fo r th is  type  
of re la tionsh ip, though, seems open o n ly  fo r women. M en are the 
enem y of both w om en and n a tu re  in  th is  novel, and th e ir violence 
against both is a t tim es presented as an in he ren t and perm anent 
phenomenon. One of the  H illw om en says of m an, " It is not in  his 
n a tu re  no t to  rape. I t  is no t in  m y  n a tu re  to  be raped. We do 
no t co-exist" (25). M a n y  indications are given th a t m en and 
wom en are so ra d ica lly  d iffe re n t fro m  one another th a t there is
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lit t le  hope fo r reconcilia tion between them . “W omen and m en 
cannot ye t, m a y  no t ever, love one another w ith o u t violence; th e y  
are no longer of the same species" (115). I t  is im plied th a t the 
"species" of w om an is closer to  n a tu re  th a n  the  "species" of m an. 
The n a tu re /cu ltu re  (and the  accom panying m ale/fem ale) dualism  is 
accepted in  th is  s to ry , and the  order of the  h ie ra rch y  is s im p ly  
reversed. W omen and n a tu re  are considered to be superior to  m en 
and cu ltu re . And according to  the  logic of dom ination w h ich  the 
dualism  is based on, i t  follows th a t wom en can dom inate men.
The danger of oppression is a lw ays present w hen su p e rio rity  is 
assigned to  one side of a dualism . We m ust be care fu l no t to 
exchange m ale oppression of w om en fo r fem ale oppression of men. 
Because i t  does no t adequately deal w ith  the  dua lis tic  roots of 
oppression, th is  s to ry  contains the  seeds of oppression and suggests 
the  su p e rio rity  of one group of people over another. Though i t  is 
understandable th a t G earhart takes th is  oversim plified perspective
to m ake her po in t (and she does acknowledge its  s im p lic ity^), the 
h ie ra rch ica l fram ew ork u n d e rly in g  the  s to ry  makes i t  an 
inadequate one fro m  the  perspective of ecofem inism .
Of the  th ree  novels, the  one th a t escapes th is  dualism  m ost 
com plete ly is W oman on th e  Edge o f Tim e. Great pains have been 
taken to  overcome the  problem s present in  the  W anderground.
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The wom en and m en of the  utop ian place called M attapo ise tt have 
become equal in  a v e ry  rea l sense. A ndrogyny has been the 
solution to  the  problem  of sexism and has gone so fa r as to deny 
the  m a jo r biological d is tinc tio n  between the  sexes - the 
reproductive  role of wom en as childbearers. W hile a 
M attapo ise ttian  characte r gives a person fro m  "the past" a to u r of 
the baby fa c to ry , she explains the  reason fo r th e ir technological 
ch ild b irth :
I t  was p a rt of wom en's long revo lu tion . W hen 
we w ere breaking a ll the  old hierarchies.
F in a lly  the re  was th a t one th in g  we had to give 
up too, the  o n ly  power we ever had, in  re tu rn  
fo r no m ore power fo r anyone. The orig ina l 
production: the  power to give b irth . Cause as 
long as we w ere biologically enchained, we'd 
never be equal. And males never w ould be 
hum anized to be loving and tender. So we a ll 
became m others (P iercy 1976, 105).
The people of M a ttapo ise tt appear to  have consciously rejected the
m ale/fem ale dualism  described in  the  W anderground. In libe ra ting
wom en, th e y  w ere care fu l no t to  give them  power over men; th e y
t r u ly  w a n t e q u a lity  fo r everyone, and to  achieve th a t th e y  had to
th ro w  out hum an h ie ra rch y  altogether. The a im  of th is  p ro ject of
e q u a lity  is adm irable, b u t the  means of c a rry in g  i t  ou t and its  end
re su lt raise questions about its  d e s ira b ility .
The firs t question about the  technologizing of ch ild b irth  as a
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means to  e q u a lity  is w h e the r i t  is based on the  n a tu re /cu ltu re  
dualism . C h ildb irth  is a n a tu ra l hum an event, som ething we share 
w ith  o the r anim als, and w h ich  is there fore  a rem inder of ou r place 
in  na tu re , no t over, above, and opposed to  it. To do aw ay w ith  
hum an c h ild b irth  is to  sever our re la tionsh ip  to  non-hum an na tu re  
in  an im p o rta n t w ay, to distance ourselves fro m  i t  in  order to 
libe ra te  ourselves. I t  seems th a t, in  th is  p a rtic u la r s itua tion , the 
M attapo isettians have accepted the  dua lis tic  v ie w  of m a n /cu ltu re  
vs. w o m an /n a tu re  and have decided th a t the  w a y  around the 
"n a tu ra l" in e q u a lity  th a t resu lts fro m  th a t dualism  is to sever the 
perceived w o m an /n a tu re  connection b y  separating wom en from  the 
"n a tu ra l enslavem ent" of th e ir bodies. The message is th a t women 
m ust distance them selves fro m  and conquer n a tu re  in  order to  be 
hum an. The idea th a t we m ust escape ou r biology to be free 
comes fro m  biological de term in ism , w h ich  has been a m a jo r 
ju s tific a tio n  fo r m ale/fem ale dualism . This v ie w  reinforces the 
no tion of wom en as closer to  n a tu re  th a n  m en and tells us th a t 
wom en's bodies determ ine th e ir s te reotyp ica l roles in  society (i.e., 
th a t wom en's reproductive  capacities m ean th e ir role is to bear 
ch ild ren  and s ta y  home as m others).
Dealing w ith  differences, like  those between fem ale and m ale 
bodies, is a key  problem  in  overcom ing oppression. We need to  find
a m iddle ground between denouncing, denying, and hating 
differences on the  one hand and g lo rify in g  them  on the other. We 
tend to  go too fa r in  one d irection  o r the  other, as Marge P iercy 
has done in  he r u top ian  answ er to the  issue of ch ild b irth . A nother 
question about the  d e s ira b ility  of M attapo ise tt's  ch ild b irth  
technology is w h e the r th is  p u rs u it of e q u a lity  has ob lite rated some 
im p o rta n t differences between th e  sexes. Is th is  s to ry  an 
"ecological" one -  is the re  adequate respect fo r and appreciation of 
d ive rs ity?  Or is d ifference done a w a y w ith  before i t  has even been 
respectfu lly  acknowledged? W iping out otherness fo r the  sake of 
e q u a lity  is an inadequate and undesirable response to  oppression 
since i t  reinforces one of the  roots of oppression -  the idea th a t 
differences cannot be to le ra ted, understood o r valued.
On the  o the r hand, the  b lu rrin g  of gender boundaries th a t 
comes w ith  the  denial of d ifference in  th is  novel is an im p o rta n t
p a rt of a u top ian s to ry .7  The p a rt about th is  androgyny th a t I do 
fin d  consistent w ith  ecofem inism  is its  m ovem ent beyond the  
p a tria rch a l constructs of gender th a t im prison us so com pletely. 
Challenging those oppressive gender categories th a t resu lt from  
m ale/fem ale dualism  is im p e ra tive  in  ou r revo lu tion . The 
dom inan t fram ew ork  th a t sp lits the  w o rld  in to  d is tinc t halves 
called m ale and fem ale and assigns d iffe re n t characteristics and
values to  each h a lf has g re a tly  im poverished a ll people. In ou r 
e ffo rts  to become w hole people we m ust m ove ou t of the fractu red  
notions of ou r selves th a t p a tria rch a l categories of gender have 
imposed upon us. But the  w a y  to do th a t is not to w hitew ash 
biological sex differences b y  o b lite ra tin g  fem ale reproductive 
capacity, as P iercy has done. That is a superfic ia l qu ick-techno-fix 
approach. A m ore thorough m ethod w ould be to  address the 
assum ptions and ro le -stereo typ ing  th a t m ake the  sex differences 
prob lem atic fo r wom en, w ith o u t denying them  th e ir unique 
capacity fo r childbearing.
Because she does no t tackle the  u n de rly in g  oppressive forces in  
he r m ove fro m  dystopia  to utopia, P iercy's fe m in is t analysis lacks 
depth. This lack is also indicated b y  the  absence of the restra in ing  
fe m in is t hand. There is no evidence of re s tra in t a t a ll in  
M attapo ise tt and no m ention  of i t  in  the  preceding struggle to 
create th is  utopia; the re  is o n ly  the  welcom ing outstretched hand 
(the opposite extrem e of the W anderground, w h ich  offered no 
outstre tched hand and o n ly  a res tra in in g  one). A lthough P iercy 
does a good jo b  of p o rtra y in g  the  m u ltip le  oppressions of her m ain  
character, Consuelo (who lives in  the  dystopian w orld  and "tra ve ls ” 
back and fo rth  fro m  the re  to  utop ian M attapoisett), her utopian 
solutions to  those fo rm s of oppression reveal a lack of depth of
analysis of a ll kinds of oppression. This is also apparent in  the 
superficia l solution to racism  in  M attapo isett.
Like the  m echan ized-ch ildb irth  rem edy fo r sexism, the 
solution to  racism  has also been a technological one in  W oman on 
th e  Edge o f Time. Through genetic engineering, th e y  "broke the 
bond between genes and cu ltu re " so the re  w ould be no chance of 
racism  ever again (104). This is no t a deep enough healing of the  
roots of oppression. If the  w a y  to  heal oppression is to accept and 
respect d ive rs ity , the  technological solutions to  sexism and racism  
fa il. They are based on a disrespect fo r difference since th e ir 
purpose is to  do aw ay w ith  it, in  the  case of sexism, and to 
scram ble i t  up technologically and contro l it, in  the case of racism . 
The version of d iv e rs ity  w h ich  is genetica lly engineered is phony 
and gives up the  essence of d iv e rs ity  in  exchange fo r superficia l 
d ive rs ity . These solutions are based on the  dom ination of na tu re
and are there fore  no t acceptable solutions fo r ecofeminism.8 They 
re ly  on technological m an ipu la tion  of na tu re  to do aw ay w ith  
re la tio na l problem s among hum an beings. The libe ra tion  of one 
group or rea lm  cannot be based on the  dom ination of another.
The tre a tm e n t of these issues in  H erland tias  both s im ila ritie s  
and d iss im ila ritie s  w ith  the  o ther utopias. The wom en of Herland 
w ould be appalled a t w h a t has been done to ch ild b irth  in
M attapo ise tt. In Herland, i t  is the  highest, m ost honorable a c tiv ity  
one can pa rtic ipa te  in . M otherhood is exalted as the  d ivine 
purpose in  life ; i t  is the  re lig ion of these wom en. In th is  w a y , th e y  
are deeply connected to  n a tu re  th rough  childbearing and b irth , in
sharp con trast w ith  the M attapo ise ttians.9 Of course, the big 
difference between the  tw o  places is the  absence of m en in  Herland 
and the  s triv in g  fo r harm onious liv in g  between wom en and m en in  
M attapo ise tt. U nlike the  W anderground, Herland's absence of m en 
is no t the  re su lt of choice (a t least no t in itia lly ), b u t of h isto rica l 
accident. However, th is  to ta l exa lta tion  of m otherhood leaves litt le  
room  fo r men, except as in fe rio r beings, since th e y  are incapable of 
bearing and b irth in g  children. They do no t possess the  suprem e 
power th a t rules in  Herland, the  power of m otherhood. Though 
the  wom en in it ia lly  welcome the  idea of liv in g  w ith  men, th e y  
fin a lly  choose not to. "We are u n w illin g  to expose our co u n try  to  
free com m unication w ith  the  rest of the  w orld  - as ye t" (Gilman 
1979, 145). There is a s im ila r ity  to  the  W anderground in  th a t m ale 
violence against wom en (rape) is d e fin ite ly  a con tribu ting  fac to r in  
th e ir decision, and i t  caused them  to  expel the  rap ist, T e rry . There 
is a subtle suggestion th a t m ale violence makes i t  impossible or 
undesirable fo r wom en to live  w ith  men. The outstretched hand 
a t the  beginning of the  s to ry  becomes a restra in ing  hand b y  the
end. Like the  W anderground, H erland  basica lly concludes th a t 
wom en and n a tu re  are closer to one another and superior to and 
be tte r o ff w ith o u t men, w ho are the  bad guys. The them e 
th roughou t both stories of the v io le n t m ale tre a tm e n t of land, 
anim als, and people is tru e  to  life  because of dualistic socialization, 
b u t i t  is no t in n a te ly  o r u ltim a te ly  true . In no t acknowledging 
th is , H erland  helps to perpetuate the  m ale/fem ale dualism .
Even m ore clear th a n  th is  is the  acceptance of the n a tu re / 
cu ltu re  dualism  in  Herland, Though the  re la tionsh ip  between the 
wom en and th e ir n a tu ra l en v iro nm e n t is a caring one on th e ir 
p a rt, i t  is also a dom inating one. There seems to  be no question 
fo r them  th a t n a tu re  is in  some sense separate from  and in fe rio r 
to  hum ans and th a t i t  is the re  to  be used b y  them . The wom en's 
use of the  land and its  creatures is respectful in  some ways, b u t i t  
is d e fin ite ly  guided b y  the  best in te rests of the  hum an inhab itan ts  
of Herland. They have found i t  m ost useful to  ob lite ra te  w ildness 
b y  rep lan ting  the  forests w ith  useful, fru it-b e a rin g  trees and b y  
breeding the  o n ly  an im als around, cats, (since a ll others have been 
purposely allowed to  die off), to k ill rodents b u t not birds, and to 
no t m ake too m uch noise. E ve ry th ing  in  Herland is tid y , polished, 
w e ll-b red , dom esticated. Both the  land and the  people are so 
controlled and cu ltiva ted ; th e y  have bred ou t w ildness and
d iv e rs ity  th rough breeding ou t "the lowest types." Everyone is 
in te llige n t, kind, pleasant, and courteous. Even the  child ren have 
lost m uch of th e ir w ildness; the re  is no room  fo r such a th in g  since 
th e y  are a lw ays im p rov in g  on na tu re .
A nother m an ifesta tion  of th is  absence of wildness in  Herland 
is the  asexua lity  of the  wom en. Their p o rtra y a l as sexless v irg in  
m others is too p a tria rch a l and C hristian fo r a fem in is t vision.
Those few  wom en w ho have m anifested sexua lity  du ring  the 
h is to ry  of Herland have been punished b y  being denied 
m otherhood. This, too, is ”u n n a tu ra l" and an unnecessary tam ing  
of wildness. C e rta in ly  i t  is understandable th a t Charlotte Perkins 
G ilm an was w ritin g  in  a tim e  {H e rland  was w ritte n  in  1915) w hen 
lesbianism  was not an approved topic fo r popular lite ra tu re , and 
so, w h e the r o r no t i t  occurred to he r th a t an all-fem ale 
co m m u n ity  does no t have to  be an asexual one, she assumed in  
the  s to ry  th a t i t  does. The heterosexism  inhe ren t in  the notion 
th a t w om en are no t sexual beings unless m en are around has no 
place in  a good s to ry , b u t i t  is m ore excusable in  G ilman's s to ry  
th a n  i t  w ould be in  a con tem porary fem in is t utopia. The people in  
both the  W anderground and M attapo ise tt are v e ry  openly and 
n a tu ra lly  sexual beings, and th e y  have no homophobic hang-ups 
about w hom  th e y  express th e ir sexu a lity  w ith . This acceptance of
d iv e rs ity  Is a strong po in t of M a ttapo ise tt (and perhaps less so of 
the  W anderground, since the re  is no sexual d iv e rs ity  - on ly
lesbianism , since the re  are o n ly  women). 10
Racial d iv e rs ity  is another th in g  m issing in  Herland b u t 
present in  M attapo ise tt and the  W anderground. Perhaps the on ly  
reason fo r the  rac ia l hom ogeneity of Herland is a geographical one 
(the lit t le  c o u n try  is com ple te ly isolated fro m  other cultures), bu t 
one wonders w h y  the  race is w h ite  w hen th is  c o u n try  seems to be 
located in  some deep hidden corner of the  w o rld  w here the
surrounding tr ib a l na tives (called "savages" b y  the  n a rra to r) are 
dark-skinned and speak in  s till "unknow n" dialects. The issue of 
race goes unexam ined, and its  omission is p a rtic u la rly  glaring
because of the  im p e ria lis tic  undertones of the  s to ry .h  W hile 
H erland  does not address racism , the  o ther tw o  novels m ake a t 
least a ha lf-hearted  a tte m p t to  do so. A lthough the  in ha b ita n ts  of 
the  o the r tw o  utopias are made up of a m ix tu re  of skin-colors, the 
p o rtra y a l of rac ia l d iv e rs ity  is v e ry  shallow, especially in  the  
W anderground. A ll th ree  novels fa il in  the  sense th a t th e y  do not 
include a deep analysis of racism . Such an analysis is an essential 
p a rt of an ecofem inist u top ian vision.
M arge P iercy, in  W oman on th e  Edge o f Time, makes the  best
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a tte m p t a t tak ing  on the  issue of racism  b y  p o rtra y in g  the 
oppression of the m a in  character, Consuelo, as a Chicana. The 
reader (th is  w h ite  reader) does get a taste of the racism  she 
experiences and of how  in te g ra lly  i t  is re lated to he r oppression as 
a wom an, a w orking-class person and a m en ta l pa tien t. W hether 
o r no t P iercy succeeds fro m  the  perspective of a w om an of color is 
unknow n to  me. She trie s  and th a t is to  be encouraged, I th in k . 
B ut P iercy's u top ian solution to the problem  of racism  fails; i t  
reveals th a t her understanding of the  the  depth of racism  is 
lim ited . As pointed ou t ea rlie r, her techno-fix fa ils to  address 
racism ; i t  is an escapist, easy answer w ith  w h ich  no healing of the 
problem  takes place.
The fac t th a t these stories are a ll w h ite , in  d iffe re n t degrees, 
should no t be overlooked. There are few  if  a n y  w orks b y  nonw hite  
w om en th a t f i t  in to  the  category of utopian novels. Does th a t 
m ean som ething about utop ian w ritin g  -  is i t  e litis t?  Do non- 
priveleged wom en no t have the  lu x u ry  to w rite  about such fa r-o ff 
fantasies since th e ir lives are grounded in  the  v e ry  rea l da y -to -d a y  
circum stances of the  present? We need to question w h a t w e’re 
doing in  te rm s of u top ian thought. If we are to ta lk  about utopia, 
we need to know  w h a t a utop ian society w ould look like  to those 
w ho dream  of an end to  th e ir own oppression on the  basis of race
and class. I t  is im p o rta n t to note th a t wom en of color m a y  no t be
as inclined to  w rite  w om en's separatist utopias (though perhaps
ra c ia lly  separatist ones) as w h ite  wom en are. In th in k in g  about
w om en's utopias like  the  W anderground and Herland, we can
consider w h a t B everly S m ith  (1981) says in  an in te rv ie w  about
lesbian separatism :
One of the m ost dangerous and erroneous 
concepts th a t separatists have p u t fo rw ard  
is th a t o ther oppressions, in  addition to 
sexism, are a ttrib u te d  to m en on ly. Some 
separatists believe th a t a lthough wom en are 
racist, w hen m en disappear and no longer ru le, 
racism  w ill no t be a problem . . . . W hat lesbian 
separatists are saying is th a t w hen we get rid  
of men, sexism and racism  w ill end too.
I th in k  th a t th is  is one of the m ost racist aspects 
of i t  because it  does no t recognize the racism  th a t 
wom en, includ ing lesbians, have (122-3).
These words serve as a rem inde r th a t w h ite  fem in ists or a n y  o ther
single group of people cannot decide w h a t a lib e ra to ry  fu tu re  w ill
look like  fo r m em bers of o the r oppressed groups and th a t a
m u ltip lic ity  of voices is necessary in  the  construction of utopian
visions. Ecofem inism  is about d iv e rs ity , theore tica lly , and m ust
rem a in  m in d fu l of i t  in  practice, includ ing in  its  utopian endeavors.
Despite th e ir shortcom ings, the  utopian visions we do have are 
im p o rta n t steps in  the  ove ra ll process of build ing a be tte r fu tu re  
fo r ourselves. The ecofem inist p ro je c t is necessarily utopian. I t  is a
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vision of som ething fo r w h ich  w e have no de fin ite  h isto rica l model 
b u t w h ich  we m ust construct and s trive  to  achieve. We are in  
such a bad s itua tion  th a t w ith o u t envisioning a be tte r w o rld  we 
w ill no t be able to  m ake one fo r ourselves. Ecofeminism, w ith  its  
analyses of a ll form s of dom ination, sees a ll too c le a rly  how fa r we 
are fro m  w here we need to  be in  order fo r people and na tu re  to be 
free fro m  exp lo ita tion. A w o rld  w ith o u t oppression, w here 
fra c tu re d  re lationships are healed, is c e rta in ly  a utopia, b u t th a t 
does no t m ean th a t we should no t s trive  tow a rd  it, th a t i t  should 
no t be a guiding vis ion fo r ou r re vo lu tio n a ry  politics. The te rm , 
"guiding vis ion" in  th is  context does no t re fe r to  a static, fixed goal 
w h ich  m ust be achieved, b u t to  a dynam ic, flexib le vision w h ich  is 
everchanging and grow ing.
In her essay on “Science and Technology in  Fem in ist Utopias," 
Patrocinio Schw eickart (1983) addresses the  need fo r utopian thought 
b y  expla in ing the com m on them e in  fe m in is t u top ian novels of "the 
a ll too rea l th re a t of violence and w ar, and of ecological depletion 
and po llu tion:"
These im pending catastrophes are traced not 
o n ly  to science and technology o r to the  m is­
guided overconfidence in  reason bu t, u ltim a te ly , 
to  the  dom ination  of wom en in  p a tria rch a l 
society. Against th is  c ritiq u e  of ou r own w orld , 
utopia is offered as a possible a lte rn a tive ; not
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som ething th a t is bound to  happen, b u t some­
th in g  a tta inab le  o n ly  b y  d in t of conscious and 
prodigious e ffo rt. U topia is necessary, no t be­
cause i t  is log ica lly or h is to rica lly  necessary, 
b u t because we need i t  (210).
Schw eickart's s ta tem ent th a t u top ia  is necessary "because we 
need it"  is a good su m m a ry  of the  ecofem inist position on utopia.
It  is im p e ra tive  th a t we w o rk  tow ard  it. Also im p o rta n t in  th is  
paragraph is he r c la im  th a t utopia is "som ething a tta inab le  o n ly  
b y  d in t of conscious and prodigious e ffo rt." I t  is no t a magical, 
o th e rw o rld ly  event w h ich  happens ove rn igh t b y  the  grace of some 
god, no r is i t  som ething th a t w ill happen in e v ita b ly . We are no t 
going to  be saved fro m  our oppression b y  d iv ine  forces; we m ust 
struggle together tow a rd  ou r own em ancipation. In  the  context of 
th is  w orld , crea ting a utop ian vis ion requires incredible 
de te rm ina tion  and w ork, and the  v is ion can bear f ru it  o n ly  if  th a t 
w o rk  is carried ou t th rough  long and continuous struggle. Ynestra 
King (1983) describes p a rt of the  w o rk  needed in  an ecofem inist 
revo lu tion  and how  th a t w ork is com patible w ith  the  notion of 
utopia.
Ecofem inism  supports utop ian visions of h a r­
monious, diverse, decentralized com m unities, 
using o n ly  those technologies based on eco­
logical principles, as the  o n ly  p ractica l solution 
fo r the  con tinua tion  of life  on e a rth  . . . .
Visions and politics are jo ined as an ecofem inist
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cu ltu re  and po litic  begin to  emerge. Central to 
th is  developm ent is ecofem inist praxis: taking 
d irec t action to  effect changes th a t are im ­
m ediate and personal as w e ll as long-te rm  and 
s tru c tu ra l. D irect actions include learn ing holis­
tic  hea lth  and a lte rna te  ecological technologies, 
liv in g  in  com m unities w h ich  explore old and 
new  form s of s p ir itu a lity  th a t celebrate a ll life  
as diverse expressions of na tu re , considering the 
ecological consequences of ou r lifesty les and per­
sonal habits, and pa rtic ip a tin g  in  creative  public 
form s of resistance. This sometimes involves 
engaging in  nonvio len t c iv il disobedience to 
p h ys ica lly  stop the machines w h ich are a rra yed  
against life  (125).
P art of th is  re vo lu tio n a ry  struggle is creating new visions 
th a t guide us as we w o rk  fo r libe ra tion  fo r a ll of life . The utopian 
novels exam ined here present visions of rea l com m unities -  sm all, 
com m unal groups of people liv in g  together and governing 
them selves in  anarch is t fashion through p a rtic ip a to ry , collective 
po litica l process. The au thors ' a ttem p ts a t freeing people and 
n a tu re  fro m  dom ination, though not a lw ays adequate, are 
im p o rta n t. The stories th e y  te ll come from  and speak fo r voices 
th a t have been silenced and provide an elem ent of hope and m an y 
constructive  ideas fro m  w h ich  we can learn in  our search fo r 
utopia. Patrocinio Schw eickart (1983) sums up w h a t we can learn 
fro m  stories like  those of the  W anderground, Herland, and
M attapo ise tt.
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Fem inist utopias o ffe r fascinating suggestions, 
b u t th e ir va lue  does no t lie  p r im a rily  in  
offering b lueprin ts  fo r the  fu tu re . They per­
fo rm  the  tw in  functions of exploring a lte rn a ­
tiv e  w orlds organized around fem in is t values, 
and of deepening our c ritic a l perspective on our 
own w orld . Above a ll, th e y  o ffe r us a libe ra ting  
experience. They a llow  us to  live  in  utopia, to 
escape the confines of ou r w orld , to  stre tch  our 
sense of w h a t is possible and w h a t is n a tu ra l, 
to see w h a t we could be in  a be tte r w orld  
(210).
A lthough i t  is a he lp fu l and im p o rta n t elem ent of lib e ra to ry  
thought, we m ust be cautious in  using utopian w ritin g /th in k in g . 
The im p o rta n t question th a t arises ou t of the  racism  discussion 
rem ains unanswered. That is, how  can we construct visions th a t 
are no t oppressive in  them selves w hen we are s till so deeply 
embedded in  the  oppressive context of ou r culture? W on't our 
visions necessarily be ta in ted  w ith  the  products of the  in s titu tio n s  
of oppression (for example, our entrenched notions about gender 
th a t are a product of pa tria rch y)?  We have seen th a t th is  is tru e  
in  m a n y  respects of the  th ree  utop ian novels analyzed in  th is  
paper.
This d iffic u lty  need not keep us fro m  envisioning, though. We 
m ust begin to  p a in t p ictures of our visions, to w ork tow ard  
constructing a new  w orldv iew . Perhaps w ith  the dissolution of 
p a tria rc h y  and o ther oppressive in s titu tio n s  in  a t r u ly  postm odern
age, as we outgrew  the  d isto rted  notions th e y  have im p rin te d  on 
ou r m inds, we w ould le t those notions go since th e y  would no 
longer be useful. In the  m eantim e, to m in im ize  the  problem  of 
creating ou r own oppressive stories and to  ensure th a t there w ill 
no t be one grand to ta liz in g  v is ion  of utopia, the  constructions of 
our visions m ust come fro m  m a n y  d iffe re n t kinds of voices. We 
m ust be care fu l no t to  speak fo r others o r to  c la im  to know  w h a t 
the  best w o rld  fo r a ll of us w ould look like. The tendency by 
m em bers of a priveleged class to  subsume others under a 
generalization w h ich  is th e ir version of " tru th "  is w h a t has led to 
the  dom inationa l re la tions we are try in g  to  transcend. W ithou t 
the  d iv e rs ity  th a t comes w ith  a m u ltip lic ity  of voices in  the 
construction of v is io n a ry  pro jects, the  po ten tia l fo r silencing and 
oppression th a t are the  lik e ly  products of a homogeneous utopia is 
too great.
In a paper on "The P ossibility of Fem inist Theory," M a rily n  
F rye  (1988) w rite s  about a w a y  of doing th e o ry  th a t would 
supposedly escape these dangers. Her c ritic ism  of th e o ry  as 
oppressive to ta liz in g  generalization calls fo r an a lte rn a tive  
libe ra ting  model fo r th e o ry , and she shows how  fem in is t th e o ry  
has both fa llen  in to  the  old fa m ilia r generalizing fram ew ork and 
m oved beyond it  in  some respects. Her focus is on getting past the
d iffic u lty  fem in ism  has had dealing w ith  differences among women. 
Because of the perceived need to present a coherent, un ified 
w o rld v ie w  th a t represents the  category of "W oman," fem in ists 
have overlooked m a n y  v a ry in g  wom en's experiences. In 
p a rticu la r, differences due to race, class, sexua lity , e th n ic ity , age, 
etc., have no t been paid a tte n tio n  to  w ith  complete respect b y  the 
priveleged wom en who have w ritte n  m ost of w h a t is called 
fe m in is t th e o ry  (1988, 5).
In  place of the generalizing th a t leads to  dom ination w ith  its  
tendency to  silence voices th a t do no t " f it"  the generalization, F rye  
proposes th in k in g  in  te rm s of dynam ic, flu id  "patterns" w h ich  are 
perceived b y  a w ide v a r ie ty  of wom en in  e ffo rts  to m ake sense out 
of ou r va ried  experience. "Instead of bring ing a phase of e n q u iry  
to  closure b y  sum m ing up w h a t is known, as o ther w ays of 
generalizing do, p a tte rn  recogn ition /construction opens fields of 
m eaning and generates new  in te rp re tiv e  possibilities" (F rye 1988,
10). The discovery of the  typ e  of pa tte rns F rye  describes requires 
encounters w ith  difference. I t  is in  paying  a tte n tio n  to anomalies, 
m aking them  cen tra l to ou r perception, th a t we see pa tte rns (13). 
The emphasis in  th is  p a tte rn -m a k in g  is on d ive rs ity , on paying 
a tte n tio n  to "others" and m aking sense of th e ir unique experiences, 
lis ten ing to th e ir voices. The g e n e ra lity  of a p a tte rn  is not a
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ge ne ra lity  th a t defeats o r is defeated b y  v a r ie ty  (12). Of these
patterns, F rye  says
They work until th e y  don't work. You find  
out w here th a t is b y  w ork ing  them  u n til 
th e y  dissolve. Like a m etaphor, a p a tte rn  
has to be appreciated, p u t to use. You have 
to ru n  w ith  it.  You m a y  o u tru n  its  power 
w ith o u t rea liz ing you have if  you are not paying 
a tte n tio n  to the  voices and perceptions of m an y 
wom en (18).
This understanding of pa tte rns could serve as a model fo r ou r 
utop ian visions th a t w ould keep those visions fro m  becoming 
stagnant and to ta liz ing . To escape a danger im p lic it in  utopian 
w ritin g  -  th a t i t  w ill be intended and /o r perceived to be a fixed 
notion of how e ve ry th in g  should u ltim a te ly  be - we m ust be sure 
to em ploy a w ide a rra y  of con tribu to rs  in  the  bu ild ing of our 
utopias. There is a h e a lth y  u n c e rta in ty  in  a d m ittin g  th a t we do 
not and cannot know  ju s t w h a t utopia ought to  be because we are 
lim ite d  b y  ou r c u ltu ra l context; th is  w ill keep us fro m  speaking fo r 
others. It is cruc ia l th a t our utopian stories rem a in  dynam ic, open 
-ended, evolving, and in te ra c tive  w ith  v a r ie ty  and re a lity  so th a t 
th e y  do not become an updated, cosm etically im proved version of a 
v e ry  old and v e ry  bad set of stories.
27
NOTES
1. The body of though t I d ra w  upon in  th is  paper is
th a t developed b y  Ynestra King du ring  the  past dozen years. 
The in te rp re ta tio n  given in  th is  paper is based on m y  under­
standing of King's th e o ry  as i t  appears in  her m a n y  articles 
and forthcom ing book, Fem in ism  and th e  R eenchantm ent o f 
N a tu re : Women, Ecology and  Peace, and as i t  was presented 
to a sem inar a t the  In s titu te  fo r Social Ecology in  J u ly  1988.
2. M uch has been w r itte n  about the  h is to rica l w om an /na tu re  
connection and how  it  has con tribu ted  to  the dom ination of 
both. The m ost w e ll-know n books are Susan G riffin 's  W oman 
and  N a tu re : The R oaring Inside H er (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1978), and C arolyn M erchan t's  The Death o f N a tu re : 
Women, Ecology a n d  th e  S c ie n tific  R evolution  (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1980). There are num erous o ther w orks on the 
subject.
3. According to Ynestra King, libe ra l fem in ism  and socialist fem ­
in ism  both m a in ta in  the  n a tu re /c u ltu re  dualism  b y  a tte m p t­
ing to overcome the w o m an /n a tu re  connection through 
acceptance as equals in  the  m ale cu ltu re . In w anting  to 
sever the  w o m an /n a tu re  connection w h ich  has played a large 
p a rt in  th e ir oppression, th e y  feel the need to abandon the  
rea lm  of n a tu re  and to gain sta tus as p a rt of cu ltu re . They 
w a n t to  jo in  w ith  m en against na tu re . U nderstandably,
th is  is the  o n ly  hope these fem in ists see fo r libera tion . On the 
o the r hand, rad ica l c u ltu ra l fem in ists embrace the w om an/ 
n a tu re  connection w holehearted ly, cla im ing th a t wom en and 
n a tu re  are superior to m en and cu ltu re . They reverse the 
dualism  fro m  its  no rm a l fo rm  of m en /cu ltu re  as superior and 
w om en /na tu re  as in fe rio r, b u t in  doing so th e y  m a in ta in  the 
dualism  (King, 1990).
4. Before he r death, Barbara Deming was "the m a jo r m en tor to 
the  [ecofem inist] m ovem ent," according to King (1988, 125).
5. The w ord “rape" serves as a m etaphor fo r the exp lo ita tion of 
the  planet. For G earhart, rape of wom en and "rape" of the 
e a rth  appear to  be the  same phenomenon.
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6, One of her characters says, w hen addressing the  issue of men, 
" It is too sim ple to  condemn them  a ll o r to  praise a ll of us. But 
fo r the  sake of e a rth  and a ll she holds, th a t s im p lic ity  m ust be 
ou r creed" (2).
. 7. W anderground  and H erland  d isp lay a m uch stronger, less c ritica l 
acceptance of given gender categories tha n  Woman on the  Edge 
o f Tim e does.
8. This dom ination of n a tu re  is inconsistent w ith  the  caring, 
non-h ie ra rch ica l re la tionsh ip  the people of M attapo ise tt see 
them selves as having  w ith  nonhum an na tu re . “We see 
ourselves as p a rtn e rs  w ith  w a te r, a ir, birds, fish, trees" (125).
The inconsistencies w ith  th is  sta tem ent go beyond the instances 
of technological solutions to sexism and racism . There is fu rth e r 
evidence of h u m a n /n a tu re  dualism  in  the  genetic m an ipu la tion  
th e y  practice and o the r h igh-tech problem -solving techniques 
th a t re flec t a m anageria l re la tionsh ip  w ith  na ture .
9. This is the  opposite extrem e of M a ttapo ise tt's  to ta l denial of 
wom en's ch ild b irth . Som ething of a m iddleground between 
these tw o extrem es is w h a t an ecofem inist utopian vision m ig h t 
include.
This childbearing of wom en issue is w h a t hangs us up in  
discussion about healing sexism. Our rig id  notions of gender 
keep us fro m  fig u rin g  th is  ou t w ith o u t w ip ing  i t  out. We 
have a lw ays used i t  as th e  gender-separating issue and b u ilt 
the  oppression of wom en up around i t  (as proof of rig id  gender 
d istinction).
10. Even though lesbian separatism  is no t an u ltim a te  answer 
fro m  an ecofem inist perspective, i t  does have a va lid  purpose 
and place, and i t  need no t be dua lis tic  if  used as an in te rim  
solution. I t  can serve as an im p o rta n t space fo r women to 
heal the  wounds of th e ir oppression w h ile  m en are un learn ing 
th e ir oppressive socialization. W omen also need a place of 
th e ir own to define them selves a p a rt from  m en since th e ir 
cu ltu re  defines them  as appendages to  men.
11. Gilman never seems to  question o r be c ritic a l of the im p e ria lis t 
a ttitu d e  of the  p a rty  of explorers w ho v is it Herland except in  
te rm s of the  nice lit t le  co u n try  of w h ite  wom en th a t th e y  
in tru d e  upon. She doesn't call in to  question th e ir adventures
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in to  the  jungles of th a t isolated corner of the  w orld , o r th e ir 
in ten tions or a ttitudes, u n til th e y  reach Herland. Their im p er­
ia lism  regarding the  tr ib a l na tives around Herland is w h a t 
makes the  lack of awareness of race issues in  th is  novel a ll the 
m ore d isturb ing.
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BEYOND DUALISM , 
TOWARD AN  ECOFEMINIST SCIENCE
C ontem porary fem in is t critiques of science deeply challenge 
the predom inant w o rld v ie w  as i t  is a rticu la te d  b y  m ainstream  
m odern science and suggest rad ica l reconstruction of th a t scientific 
w orldv iew . Several of these critiques share the goals and methods 
of ecofem inism , and both the scientific and ecofem inist perspectives 
can be illu m in a te d  and enriched b y  an e ffo rt to  d ra w  the 
connections between them . The com m on ground between the tw o 
perspectives is found in  the  com m itm en t to  overcome dualistic 
modes of thought. Since th is  com m itm en t is w h a t distinguishes 
ecofem inism  fro m  o the r fem inism s, and since science has been so 
in s tru m e n ta l in  the  construction of the  dua lis tic  w o rldv iew  th a t 
pervades w estern cu ltu re  (and so m ust be g re a tly  affected b y  
challenges to it), i t  seems th a t a n a tu ra l alliance exists between the 
fem in is t science c ritics  and ecofem inists. Both fin d  the roots of 
oppression specifica lly in  the  m a n /cu ltu re  vs. w om an /na tu re  
d ichotom y as expressed b y  the m etaphor of science as m ale m ind 
v io le n tly  pene tra ting  fem ale na tu re . The m a in  task of both, as I 
see it, is to  o ve rth ro w  th is  d ichotom y, and both agree th a t the 
now common fem in is t solution of s im p ly  em bracing the 
w o m an /n a tu re  h a lf of the d icho tom y as the  rea lm  of salvation by
g lo rify in g  tra d itio n a lly  "fem in ine" characteristics is no t an adequate 
or thorough one. Both help to shed lig h t on the  necessity of a 
radical, thoroughgoing d ism antling  and re-vis ion ing of the scientific 
w o rld v iew  fro m  the  ground up.
Since the  te rm  "ecofem inism " is c u rre n tly  used to  represent a 
diverse range of ideas, I w ill c la r ify  m y  own use of th a t te rm . M y  
understanding of ecofem inism  is based on the  w o rk of Ynestra
King, a pioneer in  ecofem inist th e o ry  and activ ism . 1 The 
fundam enta l prem ise of K ing’s th e o ry  is th a t an oppressive 
re la tionsh ip  (i.e., th a t between m en and wom en) cannot be healed 
w hen i t  is addressed in  isolation, rem oved fro m  the  context of 
o ther form s of oppression (i.e., th a t of n a tu re  b y  humans). Since 
ecofem inism  is based on the  belief th a t a ll form s of dom ination are 
related, i t  includes analyses of racism , classism, and heterosexism 
in  addition to  those of sexism and the  dom ination of na ture . A ll of 
these instances of dom ination are products of the  preva iling  
dua listic w o rldv iew  w h ich  deals w ith  difference b y  d iv id ing re a lity  
in to  tw o  halves, assigning h igher va lue to  one h a lf and low er value 
to the  other. This d iv is ion p its self against o ther in  a ll kinds of 
relationships, and we use w h a t power our position in  life  affords us 
to  keep the  "others" down, w h e the r th e y  be wom en, people of 
color, lesbians or gay m en, working-class people, o r nonhum an
form s of life. Because of th e ir common roots, these form s of 
oppression m ust be addressed in  connection w ith  one another. 
W hile ecofem inism recognizes those connections and a ttem pts to 
address a ll oppressive relationships, i t  focuses on the  jo in t 
dom inations of wom en and na tu re , because th e ir h is to rica l
association w ith  one another2 means th a t th e y  are m u tu a lly  
re in forcing and in e x trica b ly  linked.
The m a jo r po in t of departu re  fo r ecofem inism  fro m  other 
fem inism s is the  n a tu re /c u ltu re  dualism . Ecofem inism  seeks to do 
aw ay w ith  th is  dualism  th a t is perpetuated in  o ther form s of
fem in ism .3 The n a tu re /c u ltu re  dualism  w h ich  pervades our 
thought overlooks the  fact th a t hum an cu ltu re  is no t separate 
fro m  nonhum an n a tu re  b u t grew  ou t of i t  and is p a rt of it. The 
n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism  decontextualizes hum an cu ltu re  b y  
rem oving i t  fro m  its  proper place as p a rt of n a tu re  and placing it  
over and above na tu re  w here i t  ru les and exploits it. In the same 
w a y, na tu re  is decontextualized, ob jectified, and tu rn ed  in to  an 
abstraction and a resource. H isto rica lly , m en have been identified  
w ith  the  cu ltu re  side of the  dualism  and wom en w ith  the na tu re  
side. For th is  reason, the  n a tu re /c u ltu re  dualism  is a cen tra l
concern fo r ecofem inism .4
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This dualism  and others th a t go hand in  hand w ith  i t  have
also been cen tra l to  fem in is t critiques of science. In her book, The
Science Question in  Fem inism , Sandra Harding (1986) says:
The androcen tric ideology of con tem porary 
science posits as necessary, and /o r as facts, 
a set of dualism s - cu ltu re  vs. na tu re ; ra tio n a l 
m ind vs. p re ra tio na l body and irra tio n a l 
em otions and values; o b je c tiv ity  vs. su b je c tiv ity ; 
public vs. p riva te  -  and then  links m en and 
m a scu lin ity  to  the fo rm e r and wom en and 
fe m in in ity  to  the  la tte r in  each dichotom y.
Fem in ist c ritics  have argued th a t such dichoto­
m izing constitu tes an ideology in  the  strong 
sense of the  te rm : in  con trast to  m e re ly  va lue­
laden false beliefs th a t have no social power, 
these beliefs s tru c tu re  the policies and practices 
of social in s titu tio n s , including science (136).
It  is p la in ly  seen in  the w o rk  of the fem in is t science critics  
th a t science has been guided b y  oppressive ideology and th a t its  
foundation has been b u ilt upon (and has s im u ltaneously helped to 
construct) the above-m entioned dichotom ies. According to scientist 
Evelyn Fox Keller (1985, 79), science divides the w orld  in to  tw o 
parts: the knower, or m ind, w h ich  is male, and the knowable, o r 
na ture , w h ich is fem ale. The a c tiv ity  b y  w h ich the  knower can 
acquire knowledge is genderized, as the  language of science reveals. 
Sexual and p a tria rch a l m etaphors abound; the  purpose of the  m ale 
scientist is to "conquer," "penetrate," and "m aster" na ture . The 
re la tionsh ip between the know er and the  know n is one of distance
and separation. Subject and object are rad ica lly  divided, w ith o u t 
w o rld ly  re la tion ; na tu re  is ob jectified. Carolyn M erchant (1980) 
quotes Francis Bacon, the fa th e r of m odern science:
For you have b u t to fo llow  and as i t  were hound 
na tu re  in  her w anderings and you w ill be able 
w hen you like  to  lead and d rive  her a fte rw a rd  
to the  same place again. . . . N either ought a 
m an to m ake scruple of en tering and penetrating 
in to  these holes and corners, w hen the  inqu is ition  
of t ru th  is his whole object (168).
Harding makes connections between the  developm ent of the 
w o rld v ie w  th a t came to  hate and dom inate both wom en and 
n a tu re  and how  th is  w o rld v iew  was ju s tifie d  b y  and w ent hand in  
hand w ith  the  developm ent of m odern science. She draws on 
C arolyn M e rch a n t’s w o rk  to show th a t h is to rica lly , each w ave of 
scientific  advancem ent coincided w ith  a period of repression fo r 
wom en (i.e., the s ix teen th - and seventeen th -cen tu ry advent of 
m odern science and the  European w itc h  burnings) and th a t the 
changing conceptions of na tu re  corresponded w ith  those of wom en 
(i.e., w hen wom en w ere perceived as passive, mindless, submissive 
objects, so was na tu re ) (Harding 1986, 113-116).
Harding fu rth e r illu s tra te s  her c la im  w ith  the w ork of L. J. 
Jordanova, whose s tu d y  of e igh teenth- and n ine te en th -cen tu ry
biomedical science in  Europe showed th a t "sex roles were 
constitu ted in  a scientific and m edical language, and, conversely, 
the n a tu ra l sciences and m edicine w ere suffused w ith  sexual 
im agery" (Jordanova quoted in  Harding 1986, 117). M en were 
depicted in  scientific lite ra tu re  and in  anatom ical draw ings and 
w ax models as ra tio n a l hum an agents, w h ile  wom en were 
po rtrayed  as m yste rious sex objects. Jordanova argues th a t 
wom en's roles w ere diverse du ring  th is  period, no t lim ite d  to the 
stereotype prom oted b y  science, and th a t th is  gender sym bolism  
was not s im p ly  a re flection  of an existing d ivis ion of labor b y  
gender. Rather, "the lack of f i t  between ideas and experience 
c le a rly  points to  the  ideological function  of the n a tu re /cu ltu re  
dichotom y as applied to  gender." Harding concludes, “Thus, 
biomedical science in tensified  the  c u ltu ra l association of na tu re  w ith  
passive, ob jectified fe m in in ity  and of cu ltu re  w ith  active, 
ob je c tify ing  m a scu lin ity  -  and was in  re tu rn  m ore in tense ly 
m asculinized b y  th is  p ro ject" (1986, 118).
Through such p ictures of the  large role ideology has played in  
the h is to ry  of science, the  notion of pure scientific o b je c tiv ity  is 
revealed as m y th . Harding exposes m a n y  oppressive uses of th is  
m y th  in  w ritin g  about the  "seamlessness of science's pa rtic ipa tion  
in  pro jects supporting m asculine dom ination" (1986, 103). Another
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fem in is t philosopher of science, R uth Hubbard (1983), gives good
examples of the  se le c tiv ity  in  application of oppressive scientific
ideology th a t reveals th is  dom ination. One of these follows.
The ideology of w om an's n a tu re  th a t is invoked 
[to  serve the purposes of those in  power] would 
have us believe th a t a w om an's capacity to 
become pregnant leaves he r a t a ll tim es phys ica lly  
disabled b y  com parison w ith  men. The scientific 
underpinn ings fo r these ideas w ere elaborated in  
the  n ine teen th  c e n tu ry  b y  the  w h ite , u n iv e rs ity - 
educated, m a in ly  upper class m en who made up 
the  bu lk of the  new  professions of obstetrics and 
gynecology, biology, psychology, sociology and a n th ro ­
pology. But these professionals used th e ir theories 
of wom en's inna te  f r a ilty  o n ly  to  d isqua lify  the 
g irls  and wom en of th e ir own race and class who 
w ould be in  com petition w ith  them  fo r education 
and professional sta tus and m ig h t also deprive them  
of the  kinds of personal a tte n tio n  and services th e y  
w ere accustomed to  receive fro m  th e ir m others, 
w ives, and sisters. They did no t invoke wom en's 
weakness to  m itig a te  the  exp lo ita tion  of poor wom en 
w orking  long hours in  homes and factories th a t 
belonged to  m em bers of the  upper classes, nor against 
the  w ays Black slave wom en w ere forced to w o rk  fo r 
no wages in  the  p lan ta tions and homes of th e ir 
w h ite  m asters and m istresses (1983, 4).
The in te rre la tio ns  between the  racism , sexism and classism of
science can be seen c le a rly  here. Because of the idelogical basis of
m uch of science, i t  becomes clear th a t we can m ove in  a whole
new d irection sc ie n tifica lly  o n ly  w hen and if we overcome the
form s of dom ination in  a ll areas of life . According to Sandra
Harding (1986, 249), a new  science, fro m  a fem in is t perspective,
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m ust be self-consciously an ti-sexist, a n ti-ra c is t, anti-classist, etc.
The fem in is t goal is no t to pretend to  be objective, since i t  is no t 
possible to  be t r u ly  "ob jective" in  the  tra d itio n a l scientific sense.
We are a lw ays in  re la tio n  to w ha teve r we are studying  and cannot 
pretend th a t we can escape our inev itab le  hum an biases (1986).
Throughout he r book, Harding stresses the  depth of the 
androcentrism  and o the r oppressive biases th a t lie a t the core of 
m odern science and dispels the  no tion th a t these countless 
oppressive uses of science are s im p ly  m isuses of an otherw ise good 
and pure, t r u ly  ob jective  science. She asks the follow ing rhe to rica l 
questions:
Could the uses of science to create ecological 
disaster, support m ilita ris m , tu rn  hum an 
labor in to  p h ys ica lly  and m e n ta lly  m u tila ­
tin g  w ork, develop w ays of con tro lling  'o thers'
- the  colonized, women, the  poor - be ju s t 
misuses of applied science? Or does th is  kind 
of conceptualization of the characte r and 
purposes of experim enta l m ethod ensure th a t 
w h a t is called bad science o r misused science 
w ill be a d is tin c tiv e ly  m ascu lin ist science-as-usual?
(1986, 116).
She makes a convincing case th a t science is deeply shaped b y  w h a t 
she calls “coercive" values. “Classist, rac ist, and sexist social 
re la tions are as cen tra l to the  organization of science as th e y  are to 
the  organization of social life  m ore genera lly" (1986, 78). Because 
these values so deeply perm eate science as we know  it, says
Harding, we m ust to ta lly  reconstitu te  a science w ith o u t allegiance 
to  those values. However, she does no t propose a lte rn a tive  visions 
of science and says th a t we cannot do so w h ile  we are s till 
entrenched in  the  d is to rting , oppressive forces of our cu ltu re . It  is 
o n ly  w hen we have transcended those forces th a t we w ill be able 
to  bu ild  a new  science.
On the  o the r hand, the p ro jec t of some fem in is t philosophers
of science has been to  o ffe r a lte rn a tiv e  visions of a science w h ich  is
not based on these false dualism s between n a tu re /cu ltu re ,
m ale/fem ale, sub ject/ob ject, etc., and Harding is supportive of these
effo rts  ("successor science projects," as she calls them ) to a degree.
E velyn Fox Keller offers a constructive  use of the s u b je c tiv ity  th a t
is in e v ita b ly  a p a rt of science, in  con trast w ith  the oppressive uses
of m uch unacknow ledged scientific s u b je c tiv ity . Keller has proposed
a new notion of scientific o b je c tiv ity  th a t is no t opposed to
s u b je c tiv ity  b u t is som ething of a synthesis of the dichotomous
notions of o b je c tiv ity  and s u b je c tiv ity . This new  notion is called
"dynam ic o b je c tiv ity " and it  is distinguished from  w h a t Keller (1985,
117) calls "s ta tic  o b je c tiv ity :"
Dynam ic o b je c tiv ity  aim s a t a fo rm  of know­
ledge th a t grants to the  w o rld  around us its  
independent in te g r ity  b u t does so in  a w a y  
th a t rem ains cognizant of, indeed relies on, 
ou r co n n e c tiv ity  w ith  th a t w orld . In this,
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dynam ic o b je c tiv ity  is no t un like  em pathy, 
a fo rm  of knowledge of o ther persons th a t 
draw s e x p lic ity  on the  com m ona lity  of feelings 
and experience in  order to  enrich one’s under­
standing of ano ther in  his or her own rig h t.
By contrast, I call s ta tic  o b je c tiv ity  the p u rsu it 
of knowledge th a t begins w ith  the severance of 
subject fro m  ob ject ra th e r tha n  a im ing a t the 
disentanglem ent of one fro m  the  other.
D ynam ic o b je c tiv ity 's  recognition of sim ultaneous independence 
and co n n e c tiv ity  is s tr ik in g ly  s im ila r to  the  ecofem inist notion of 
"ecological” relatedness. The ecofem inist a lte rn a tive  to  the 
oppositional re la tionsh ip  between hum ans and n a tu re  advanced by 
m odern science is a close, m u tu a l one w h ich  is based on an 
evo lu tion a ry  understanding of how  hum an cu ltu re  emerged ou t of 
nonhum an n a tu re  and the re fo re  recognizes the connection between 
the tw o. Though no d is tin c t line  is d raw n between the hum an and 
n a tu ra l realm s, the  tw o are  no t to ta lly  merged together; the 
uniqueness of each is respected ra th e r th a n  b lu rred . The proposed 
a lte rn a tive  to dua lis tic  th in k in g  is ecological th in k in g , w h ich is 
based on the  concepts of interdependence and balance found in  the 
science of ecology - concepts th a t are co n tra d ic to ry  to the 
h ie ra rch ica l dualism  th a t underlies the  system s of oppression. 
Following ecology, ecofem inism  sees the  w o rld  in  te rm s of in te r­
re lations among people, beings, things. Relations of hum ans to 
nonhum an n a tu re  and of d iffe re n t genders, races, classes, etc., to
one another are no t oppositional or h iera rch ica l. The ecological 
princip le  of "u n ity  in  d iv e rs ity " provides a model fo r a new
w o rld v iew  in  w h ich  differences are recognized b u t no t ranked or
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opposed to  one another. I t  te lls  us th a t d iv e rs ity  in  na tu re  is 
necessary and enriching, and the  same is tru e  in  the  hum an 
rea lm , according to  ecological th in k in g . An acceptance of and 
h e a lth y  respect fo r d iv e rs ity  is an im p o rta n t elem ent in  
overcom ing oppression of a ll kinds, since the  reason th a t m ost 
groups are oppressed is because th e y  are d iffe re n t from  the 
established and ru lin g  "no rm ." From  an ecological perspective, 
though, "otherness" need no t be considered in fe rio r; if  accepted, we 
can learn  fro m  it  and en rich  ou r own lives th rough connection 
w ith  "others."
If ecological th in k in g  w ere accepted and if  Keller's dynam ic
o b je c tiv ity  w ere the  basis fo r science, then science w ould not be
dom inating. Rather, i t  w ould be a tte n tive  and loving, as Keller
(1985) explains in  the fo llow ing passage:
[D ynam ic o b je c tiv ity ] recognizes difference 
between self and o the r as an o p p o rtu n ity  
fo r a deeper and m ore a rticu la te d  kinship 
. . . .  The scientist em ploys a fo rm  of 
a tten tion  to  the  n a tu ra l w o rld  th a t is like 
one's ideal a tte n tio n  to the  hum an w orld ; 
i t  is a fo rm  of love. The capacity fo r such 
a tten tion , like the  capacity  fo r love and 
em pathy, requires a sense of self secure
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enough to  to le ra te  both difference and con­
t in u ity  . . . .  (117-18).
The loving attentiveness Keller describes is the same kind of love
described b y  M a rily n  F rye  (1983), in  her essay on arrogance and
love. Like the scientist w ho practices dynam ic o b je c tiv ity , F rye 's
"loving eye" "knows the  independence of the o ther" and respects
th a t independence. The one w ith  the  loving eye does not usurp the
other in to  her own in terests; ne ithe r does she give up her interests.
"W hat is the case is th a t her in te res t does no t blend the seer and
the seen . . . .  One who sees w ith  a loving eye is separate from
the o ther w hom  she sees" (1983, 264). This m aintenance of the  tw o
d is tinc t selves is im p o rta n t fo r the possib ility  of h e a lth y
re lationsh ip, w h ich  can o n ly  happen w hen tw o  strong selves come
together. If the boundaries between self and o ther are to ta lly
b lu rred , otherness is often sm othered and dom ination follows. In
the loving eye, th is  respect fo r boundaries is coupled w ith  h u m ility
and attentiveness.
[The loving eye] is the  eye of a seer who knows 
th a t na tu re  is in d iffe re n t. I t  is the eye of one 
who knows th a t to  know  the  seen, one m ust 
consult som ething o the r tha n  one's own w ill and 
in terests and fears and im agination. One m ust 
look a t the th ing . One m ust look and lis ten  and 
check and question.
The loving eye is one th a t pays a certa in  sort of 
a tten tion  (265).
The re lationships between self and o ther described b y  F rye  
and Keller are m anifesta tions of the respect fo r otherness 
advocated b y  ecofem inism . W ith  such love and respect as the  basis 
of our in te ractions w ith  one another and w ith  na ture , our science 
w ould be e n tire ly  d iffe re n t fro m  the  one we now  have, w h ich  is 
based on arrogance and dom ination.
F rye  describes arrogance In  contrast to love. The one w ith  
the arrogant eye objectifies and silences the o ther ra th e r than  
respecting and paying a tte n tio n  to it. He assumes th a t the w orld  
and e ve ry th in g  in  i t  exists fo r his use. Therefore, he sim plifies 
e ve ry th in g  to m ake it  understandable enough to use it. "The 
arrogant perceiver does no t countenance the possib ility  th a t the 
Other is independent, in d iffe re n t" (262-263), This a ttitu d e  is 
cha racte ris tic  of m a instream  m odern science.
As m uch of m odern science is revealed as oppressive ideology, 
though, i t  becomes clear th a t it  is both possible and necessary to 
d ism antle  ou r present science and bu ild  another. According to 
Harding (1986, 240), “the  fem in is t successor science projects requ ire  
the  rad ica l belief th a t i t  is possible to redefine po litica l and 
in te llec tua l progress in  w ays th a t reveal the social hierarchies of 
racism , classism, sexism, and cu ltu re -ce n trism  to be not n a tu ra l, 
no t due to biological differences, b u t socia lly created and thus
changeable." Since science is socially constructed, we can de- 
construct it, and we m ust do so if  we are to m ove beyond the 
oppressive s tructu res th a t ru le  our society. Harding says of even 
w h a t she calls one of the  "least th rea ten ing  fem in is t challenges to 
science, nam e ly  the e lim in a tio n  of m asculine bias in  social science 
and biological th e o ry  and research," th a t i t  "requires a 
fundam enta l tra n s fo rm a tio n  of concepts, methods, and 
in te rp re ta tio n s  in  these areas, and a c ritic a l exam ination of the  
logic of scientific in q u iry  - ra th e r th a n  m ere reform s" (1986, 108).
A fundam enta l sc ien tific  revo lu tion  is a necessary p a rt of the  
ecofem inist pro ject. Y nestra  King (1990, 6) w rite s  th a t "the serious 
consideration of ecology b y  fem in ists suggests c ritic a l directions fo r 
the o ry , and creates an im p e ra tive  fo r a fem in is t epistemology 
based on a no n ins trum e n ta l w a y  of Knowing, This im plies a 
re fo rm u la tion , no t a repud ia tion , of reason and science." We m ust 
reconstruct science according to  the  new w ays of conceptualizing 
and tak ing  up w ith  the  w o rld  th a t ecofem inism  envisions and is 
w ork ing  tow ard. A ra d ica lly  d iffe re n t understanding of our 
relatedness to  each o the r and to nonhum an na tu re  is the on ly  
th in g  th a t can save ou r w orld . A society in  w h ich  d ive rs ity  is 
celebrated ra th e r th a n  suppressed w ould produce a m ore ecological 
science. If we w ere no t so separate fro m  na tu re  and did not have
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such a fractu red , dom ina ting  re la tionsh ip  w ith  it,  we would 
n a tu ra lly  take in to  consideration a n y  effects of ou r scientific 
m ethod on the  ea rth  and its  life  form s. In  an essay on "Science 
and Technology in  F em in ist Utopias," Patrocinio Schw eickart (1983) 
explains w h y  a new science and technology are im pera tive  fro m  an 
ecofem inist perspective:
. . .  a key fe a tu re  of the fem in is t perspective 
is the  rea liza tion  th a t, in  p a tria rc h y , science 
and technology are governed b y  the same 
princ ip le  th a t governs the re la tionsh ip  between 
the  sexes - the  m aste r/s lave dialectic between 
self and Other. The dom ination of wom en and 
the dom ination of n a tu re  serve as models fo r 
each other. Thus, science and technology have 
a place in  a fe m in is t utopia o n ly  if  th e y  can be 
redefined a p a rt fro m  the logic of dom ination 
(210).
S chw eickart‘s focus on utop ian thought goes hand in  hand 
w ith  the  utopian elem ent in  ecofem inism . W ith  its  analyses of a ll 
fo rm s of dom ination, ecofem inism  sees a ll too c le a rly  how fa r we 
are fro m  w here we need to  be in  order fo r people and na tu re  to be 
free from  explo itation. A w o rld  w ith o u t oppression, where 
re lationships are repaired and w here ou r science is consistent w ith  
ecological principles and does no t disem power and exploit hum an 
beings is ce rta in ly  a utopia, b u t th a t does no t mean th a t we should 
no t s trive  tow ard  it, th a t i t  should no t be a guiding vision fo r our
re vo lu tio n a ry  politics. W ith o u t envisioning a be tte r w orld , we w ill 
not be able to  make one fo r ourselves. The te rm , "guiding vision" 
in  th is  context does no t re fe r to  a sta tic, fixed goal w h ich  m ust be 
achieved, b u t to  a dynam ic, flexib le v is ion  w h ich  is everchanging 
and grow ing.
The question arises, how can we construct visions w hen we 
are s till so deeply embedded in  m odernism , p a tria rch y , etc.? 
W ouldn’t  ou r visions be ta in ted  w ith  the products of these in s ti­
tu tio ns  (for example, ou r notions about gender)? Harding suggests 
th a t i t  is too soon to  know  w h a t a solution to  the problems of 
science and gender ought to  look like. She realizes th a t the 
transcendence of the  categories of gender, race, class, etc. th a t is a 
necessary precursor to a nonoppressive science is unim aginable to 
us who are f irm ly  entrenched in  those categories. Harding (1986, 
139) quotes Elizabeth Fee, "For us to im agine a fem in is t science in  a 
fe m in is t society is ra th e r like  asking a m edieval peasant to im agine 
the  th e o ry  of genetics or the  production of a space capsule; our 
images are, a t best, lik e ly  to  be sketchy and unsubstan tia l."
This fac t need not keep us fro m  envisioning. We m ust begin 
to  p a in t p ictures of ou r visions, to  w o rk  tow ard  constructing a new 
w orldv iew . Perhaps w ith  the dissolution of p a tria rc h y  and o ther 
oppressive in s titu tio n s  in  a t r u ly  postm odern age, as we outgrew
the  d istorted notions th e y  have im p rin te d  on our m inds, we would 
le t these notion go since th e y  w ere no longer useful. To ensure 
th a t the re  w ould no t be one grand to ta liz ing  vision of utopia, the 
constructions of ou r visions m ust come from  m a n y  d iffe re n t kinds 
of voices. W ith o u t d ive rs ity , the  po ten tia l fo r silencing and 
oppression th a t are the  lik e ly  products of a homogeneous utopia is 
too great.
In a paper on “The P ossibility of Fem inist Theory," M a rily n  
F rye  (1988) w rite s  about a w a y  of doing th e o ry  th a t would 
supposedly escape these dangers. Her c ritic ism  of th e o ry  as 
oppressive to ta liz in g  generalization calls fo r an a lte rn a tive  
libe ra ting  model fo r the o ry . She proposes th in k in g  in  te rm s of 
dynam ic, flu id  “pa tte rns" w h ich  are perceived b y  a w ide v a r ie ty  of 
wom en in  e ffo rts  to m ake sense ou t of our varied  experience. 
"Instead of b ring ing  a phase of e n q u iry  to closure b y  sum m ing up 
w h a t is known, as o the r w ays of generalizing do, pa tte rn  
recogn ition /construction opens fields of m eaning and generates new 
in te rp re tiv e  possibilities" (F rye 1988, 10). The discovery of these 
pa tte rns requires encounters w ith  difference. I t  is in  paying 
a tte n tio n  to anomalies, m aking them  cen tra l to our perception, 
th a t we see pa tte rns, in  con trast w ith  the m ore conventional 
m ethod of igno ring /ove rrid ing  them  to get generalization (13). The
gene ra lity  of a p a tte rn  is no t a ge ne ra lity  th a t defeats or is
defeated b y  v a r ie ty  (12). Of these patterns, F rye  says:
They w o rk  u n til th e y  do n 't w ork. You find  
ou t w here th a t is b y  w ork ing  them  u n til 
th e y  dissolve. Like a m etaphor, a p a tte rn  
has to  be appreciated, p u t to  use. You have 
to  ru n  w ith  it. You m a y  o u tru n  its  power 
w ith o u t rea liz ing  you  have if  you  are not 
paying a tte n tio n  to  the  voices and perceptions 
of m a n y  w om en (18).
This understanding of p a tte rns  could be a model fo r ou r utopian
visions. This k ind  of approach w ould keep those visions from  being
stagnant and to ta liz ing .
A scientific  tra n s la tio n  of F rye 's  notion of paying a tte n tio n  to 
anom aly and a v a r ie ty  of voices in  pa tte rn -m ak ing  can be found in  
the  scientific  m ethod of Barbara McClintock. Eve lyn Fox Keller 
w rite s  about McClintock, w ho discovered the phenomenon of genetic 
transposition th rough  paying  a tte n tio n  to  an ab e rra n t p a tte rn  she 
discovered in  he r research on corn plants. Her unique m ethod of 
scientific research was responsible fo r he r im p o rta n t discovery, 
w h ich  was overlooked b y  m ost scientists who disregarded 
aberrations, a lw ays seeking to f i t  in d iv id u a l events and specimens 
in to  a fram ew ork  of generalization. McClintock, on the o ther hand, 
had a rea l respect fo r d iv e rs ity  th a t m eant th a t she gave her 
a tte n tio n  to difference. She was dedicated to "listening to  the
m a te ria l" in  a w a y  th a t m eant she had an in te rsub jective  
re la tionsh ip  w ith  the  m a te ria l she studied ra th e r th a n  a 
tra d itio n a l sub ject/ob ject re la tionsh ip. In he r own words, there  is 
an elem ent of love in  he r scientific  m ethod - a unique and 
respectful a ttentiveness th a t does no t a llow  fo r ob jectifica tion and 
dom ination. "M cClintock can risk  the  suspension of boundaries 
between sub ject and ob ject w ith o u t je op a rd y to  science precisely 
because, to  her, science is no t prem ised on th a t d ivision" (Keller 
1985, 164).
In the  re la tionsh ip  she describes w ith  plants, 
as in  hum an re lations, respect fo r difference 
constitu tes a c la im  no t o n ly  on ou r in te rest 
b u t on ou r capacity  fo r em pa thy  -  in  short, 
on the highest fo rm  of love: love th a t allows 
fo r in tim a c y  w ith o u t the  an n ih ila tio n  of d if­
ference. I use the w ord love ne ithe r loosely 
nor se n tim e n ta lly , b u t ou t of fid e lity  to  the 
language M cClintock herself uses to describe a 
fo rm  of a tte n tio n ; indeed a fo rm  of thought.
Her voca bu la ry  is consisten tly  a vocabu la ry of 
kinship, of affection, of em pathy (164).
M cClintock's w a y  of doing science is com patible w ith  
ecofem inism 's ecological respect fo r d iv e rs ity  and opposition to the 
dua listic  re la tionsh ip  of n a tu re /cu ltu re , etc. Keller's explication of 
the difference p rinc ip le  practiced b y  M cClintock shows its  s im ila r ity  
to ecofem inism 's no tion of difference:
Difference constitu tes a princ ip le  fo r ordering
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the  w orld  ra d ica lly  un like  the  princ ip le  of 
d ivision o r d ichotom ization (subject-object, m ind - 
m a tte r, feeling-reason, disorder-law ). Whereas 
these oppositions are directed tow ard  a cosmic 
u n ity  ty p ic a lly  excluding or devouring one of 
the  pa ir, tow a rd  a u n ify in g , all-encompassing 
law , respect fo r difference rem ains content w ith  
m u ltip lic ity  as an end in  itse lf. . . .
Difference, in  th is  w o rld  v iew , does no t posit d iv i­
sion as an epistemological prerequisite  -  i t  does not 
im p ly  the  necessity of hard and fast divisions in  
na tu re , o r in  m ind, or in  the re la tio n  between 
m ind  and na tu re . D ivision severs connection and 
imposes distance; the  recognition of difference provides 
a s ta rtin g  po in t fo r relatedness. I t  serves both as 
a clue to new  modes of connectedness in  na ture , and 
as an in v ita tio n  to engagement w ith  na tu re  (1985, 163).
A lthough Keller and ecofem inism  share th is  understanding of
difference, i t  means d iffe re n t th ings to  each. For ecofeminism, i t
means th a t we need a new  science based on such modes of re la tion
- one th a t is no t th o ro u g h ly  ta in te d  b y  oppressive biases; fo r Keller
it  means a m ore superfic ia l re fo rm  of the  science we know. She
believes i t  is su ffic ien t to develop positive scientifc models present
in  m odern science. Though she offers a good beginning answer,
Keller doesn't go deep enough w ith  he r analysis. She clings to the
tra d itio n a l notion of an untouchable, alm ost sacred s tru c tu re  a t the
core of m odern science; she says we cannot have a d iffe ren t science
(1985, 178). A t the  same tim e , she calls fo r a gender-free science.
M ust not a gender-free  science be a d iffe re n t one, though, since the
one we know  is deeply androcentric?
Regardless of he r fa ilu re  to see the  depth of science's engender- 
m ent, Keller's ideas on science as genderless are im p o rta n t and 
helpfu l. She argues s tro n g ly  th a t M cClintock's science is non­
gendered. Though i t  m a y  be tem pting  to  label i t  ''fem in ine" 
because of he r emphasis on feeling, in tu itio n , and relationship, we 
w ould be w rong to do so. A gender-free ra th e r tha n  a fem in ine 
science is w h a t Keller advocates, along w ith  Harding, Bleier and 
ecofem inism . A non-dua listic science is a non-gendered science.
Our dichotomous categories of gender are sym ptom s of a frac tu re d  
people; we m ust transcend them  to  be whole again. C erta in ly, a 
gender-free science w ould be m ore "fem in ine" th a n  our present 
science, w h ich  is "m asculine." It w ould be whole, though, ra th e r 
tha n  fem in ine - no t frac tu red , ne ithe r m asculine n o r fem inine.
Keller says M cClintock w anted to  c la im  science as a hum an  ra th e r 
th a n  a m ale endeavor (Keller 1985, 175).
This ho listic  approach is the  best one fro m  an ecofem inist 
perspective. The answer is no t to  reverse the  dualism  and 
embrace w h a t is on the  w o m an /n a tu re  side (love, caring, etc.)
w h ile  re jecting  w h a t's  on the  m a le /cu ltu re  side (o b je c tiv ity , etc.).5 
That perpetuates the  dualism  and g lorifies the  characteristics of an 
oppressed class. Fem inists need to  be w a ry  of buying  in to  the
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p a tria rch a l ideology th a t's  been designed to  oppress wom en. In  her 
book, Science and  Gender, scientist R uth Bleier (1984) makes th is  
clear:
We m a y  indeed va lue  the characteristics 
th a t in  our W estern societies are associated 
w ith  femaleness - and, indeed, need to celebrate 
them , since th e y  seem to be the o n ly  force 
standing in  the  w a y  of ou r society's plunge 
in to  se lf-destruction - b u t we need no t ju s tify  
them  as n a tu ra l, biological o r innate. . . .
The chance fo r libe ra ting  ideas lies no t w ith  
try in g  to tu rn  tra d itio n a l o r m isogynist or 
rac is t ideologies 180 degrees around and in  our 
favo r, b u t in  tu rn in g  them  under com pletely, 
destroying th e ir roots (12).
We can begin to  destroy the  roots of the  oppressive ideologies 
Bleier speaks of b y  deconstructing the  categories in  w h ich science is 
so f irm ly  entrenched. Its  understandings and defin itions of na ture , 
gender, etc. are dom inationa l and need to be e n tire ly  replaced b y  
new ones. W hen we transcend the  dualistic fram ew ork, the lines 
of dem arcation between categories b lu r, and our notions about 
those categories are deeply challenged and ra d ica lly  altered. An 
a lte rna te , in te rsub je c tive  fram ew ork is m uch m ore flu id , dynam ic, 
uncerta in , evolving, and i t  is unse ttling  to  the to ta liz ing  m ind of 
m ost of m odern science, th e o ry , and politics. But th is  is as it  
should be, acording to Harding (1986). She says:
23
I t  w ould be h is to rica lly  p rem atu re  and 
de lusionary fo r fem in ism  to  a rriv e  a t a 
‘m aster th e o ry ,' a t a ’no rm a l science' 
paradigm  w ith  conceptual and methodological 
assum ptions th a t we a ll th in k  we accept.
Fem in ist a n a ly tica l categories sh o u ld be 
unstable a t th is  m om ent in  h is to ry " (244).
Harding, like  F rye, is com m itted  to keeping fem in is t th e o ry  from
becoming too sure of itse lf and too homogenous. U n ce rta in ty  is
he a lth y ; we cannot c la im  to  speak fo r others o r to know  “the
tru th "  about fem in ism , ju s t as w e a lth y  w h ite  s tra ig h t m en cannot
speak fo r a ll the  others or know  "the tru th "  about science.
Though we cannot know  precisely w h a t an ecofem inist science 
w ould look like, we can envision some possibilities. Once the 
r ig id ity  of the dua lis tic  model is replaced b y  the flu id ity  of the 
in te rsub je c tive  one, the  whole w orld  looks d iffe ren t; i t  is no longer 
based on re lationships of dom ination b u t on respectful, non- 
h ie ra rch ica l ones. U n til th a t happens, though, we m ust w ork 
w ith in  our present context. W hile postm odernism  is useful in  an 
ecofem inist c ritiq u e  of science, it  m ust no t be ahistorical or 
acontextual. We can use the postm odernist c ritiq ue  w ith o u t losing 
sight of the  re a lity  th a t lim its  and constructs us. It is on ly  
p ractica l and reasonable th a t we m ove w ith in  our given w orld  in  
order to m ake a n y  rea l m ovem ent aw ay from  oppression. In
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order to be m eaningfu l, ou r visions need to grow  ou t of a place 
grounded in  a con textua l re a lity . A t the  same tim e, though, we 
can im agine the  freedom  th a t lies beyond the confines of th a t 
re a lity  and begin to  a c tive ly  im agine and construct it.
Ecofem inism  s trives fo r a balance between c ritica l, v is io n a ry
th e o ry  and do w n -to -ea rth  politics based on the  h isto rica l context
w ith in  w h ich  we fin d  ourselves. I t  is useful to  w o rk  w ith  gender
differences w h ile  acknowledging th a t th e y 're  socially constructed
and m oving beyond them . The w o m an /n a tu re  connection is
ne ithe r to ta lly  embraced nor abandoned in  ecofem inism, b u t is
used as a vantage po in t fro m  w h ich  to  see both sides of the
n a tu re /cu ltu re  dualism . Y nestra King says:
It is as if  wom en w ere en trusted  w ith  and 
kept the  d ir ty  lit t le  secret th a t h u m a n ity  
emerges fro m  non-hum an n a tu re  in to  society 
in  the  life  of the  species, and the person. The 
process of n u rtu rin g  an unsocialized, u n d iffe r­
en tia ted hum an in fa n t in to  an ad u lt person - 
the  socialization of the  organic - is the  bridge 
between n a tu re  and cu ltu re  . . . .  The key to 
the  h is to ric  agency of wom en w ith  respect to 
n a tu re /c u ltu re  dualism  lies in  the  fact th a t the 
m edia ting tra d itio n a l conversion ac tiv ities  of 
w om en - m othering, cooking, healing, fa rm ing, 
foraging - are as social as th e y  are n a tu ra l 
(King 1990, 17).
King does not c la im  th a t wom en are in h e re n tly  closer to na tu re  
th a n  men, b u t does c la im  th a t because of th e ir assigned social roles
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th roughou t h is to ry , th e y  m a y  be in  a position to  see m ore c le a rly  
and to appreciate m ore fu lly  the  connections between cu ltu re  and 
na ture . Using the  w o m an /n a tu re  connection in  th is  w a y  helps to 
u ltim a te ly  m ove beyond its  dualism .
Like ecofem inism , Harding advocates w ork ing  w ith in  our given 
circum stances w h ile  s im u ltaneously transcending them . She 
encourages both standpoin t epistemologies (successor science 
projects) and com plete postm odernist transcendence, since the 
dia lectica l tension between the  tw o  can help to  keep our theories of 
science heterogenous and flexible. Keller and F rye  (1983) are he lp fu l 
in  envisioning and w o rk ing  tow ard  a non-dua listic  science b y  
rem ind ing us to pay a tte n tio n  to differences, w h ile  we u ltim a te ly  
m ove aw ay fro m  lim itin g  categories and to ta liz in g  th e o ry  
altogether.
Harding (1986) makes the po in t th a t m ost of fem in ism  has 
been presented as to ta liz in g  the o ry , m eaning th a t i t  has sought 
generalization a t the expense of d ive rs ity . She argues against the 
possib ility  and d e s ira b ility  of such th e o ry  fo r fem in ism  and points 
ou t th a t some fem in is t th e o ry  a ttem p ts  to  no t be tota liz ing:
E qua lly  im p o rta n t s tra ins  in  fem in ism , however, 
insist th a t i t  cannot be a to ta liz in g  the o ry . Once 
"w om an" is deconstructed in to  "wom en," and 
"gender" is recognized to have no fixed referents,
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fem in ism  itse lf dissolves as a th e o ry  th a t can 
re fle c t the  voice of a na tu ra lized  or essentialized 
speaker (246).
If ecofem inism  w ants to transcend the oppressive w o rldv iew  i t  
criticizes, i t  m ust self-consciously refuse to conceptualize oppression 
in  a to ta liz ing  fram ew ork b y  copying the  language and 
m ethodology of the oppressors. We m ust m ove beyond these 
fram ew orks - though it  is pa in fu l and frigh ten ing  - out in to  the 
unknow n be au tifu l w o rld  of freedom  th a t we struggle to find /bu ild . 
I t  is a d iffic u lt, un ce rta in  place in  w h ich  we fin d  ourselves, b u t we 
need no t be paralyzed b y  th a t u n ce rta in ty . Rather we m ust rise 
to  the  challenge, engage in  the  struggle to  seek libe ra tion , and 
continue to fo llow  our dream s of a ra d ica lly  o ther tim e, a lw ays 
rem em bering to  keep our ears open to the  v a r ie ty  of voices we 
encounter along the  w ay, and re jo ic ing  in  the m u ltip lic ity  of selves 
and beings, both hum an and nonhum an, th a t color our experience.
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NOTES
1. The body of tho ug h t I d ra w  upon in  th is  paper is
th a t developed b y  Y nestra King du ring  the  past dozen years.
The in te rp re ta tio n  given in  th is  paper is based on m y  under­
standing of King's th e o ry  as i t  appears in  her m a n y  artic les 
and fo rthcom ing book, F em in ism  and  th e  R eenchantm ent o f 
N a tu re : Women, Ecology and  Peace, and as i t  was presented 
to a sem inar a t the  In s titu te  fo r Social Ecology in  J u ly  1988.
2. M uch has been w r itte n  about the  h is to rica l w om an /na tu re  
connection and how  i t  has con tribu ted  to  the  dom ination of 
both. The m ost w e ll-know n  books are Carolyn M erchant's 
The Death o f N a tu re : Women, Ecology and the  S c ie n tific  
R evolu tion  (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), and
Susan G riffin 's  W oman and N a tu re : The R oaring Inside H er 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978). There are num erous o ther 
w orks on the  subject.
3. According to Y nestra King, lib e ra l fem in ism  and socialist fem ­
in ism  both m a in ta in  the  n a tu re /c u ltu re  dualism  b y  a tte m p t­
ing to  overcome the  w o m a n /n a tu re  connection through 
acceptance as equals in  the  m ale cu ltu re . In w a n tin g  to 
sever the  w o m a n /n a tu re  connection w h ich  has played a 
large p a rt in  th e ir oppression, th e y  feel the need to abandon 
the  rea lm  of n a tu re  and to  gain sta tus as p a rt of cu ltu re .
They w a n t to  jo in  w ith  m en against na ture . Understandably, 
th is  is the  o n ly  hope these fem in ists see fo r libe ra tion . On the 
o the r hand, rad ica l c u ltu ra l "n a tu re " fem in ists embrace the 
w o m an /n a tu re  connection w holehearted ly, cla im ing th a t women 
and n a tu re  are superior to m en and cu ltu re . They reverse the 
dualism  fro m  its  no rm a l fo rm  of m e n /cu ltu re  as superior and 
w om en /na tu re  as in fe rio r, b u t in  doing so th e y  m a in ta in  the 
dualism  (1990).
4. For fu rth e r developm ent and examples of th is  and its  corres­
ponding dualism s, see m y  preceding paper, "In Search of an 
Ecofem inist Utopia."
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5. This is no t tru e  of o the r types of ecofem inism  th a t are incon­
sistent w ith  m y  de fin itio n  of it. M a n y  w ritin g s  called 
"ecofem inist" do en thus iastica lly  em brace the  w om an /na tu re  
connection as in h e re n t and bu ild  th e o ry  fro m  th a t s ta rtin g  
point.
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